Taranaki Regional Council

AGENDA

Taranaki Civil Defence

Joint Committee Meeting

Thursday 14 March 2024, 10.30am



Civil Defence Emergency Management - Joint Committee

14 March 2024 09:00 AM

Whakataka te hau

Karakia to open and close meetings

Whakataka te hau ki te uru	Cease the winds from the west
Whakataka te hau ki te tonga	Cease the winds from the south
Kia mākinakina ki uta	Let the breeze blow over the land
Kia mātaratara ki tai	Let the breeze blow over the ocean
Kia hī ake ana te atakura	Let the red-tipped dawn come with a sharpened air
He tio, he huka, he hauhu	A touch of frost, a promise of glorious day
Tūturu o whiti whakamaua kia tina.	Let there be certainty
Tina!	Secure it!
Hui ē! Tāiki ē!	Draw together! Affirm!

Nau mai e ngā hua

Karakia for kai

Nau mai e ngā hua	Welcome the gifts of food
o te wao	from the sacred forests
o te ngakina	from the cultivated gardens
o te wai tai	from the sea
o te wai Māori	from the fresh waters
Nā Tāne	The food of Tāne
Nā Rongo	of Rongo
Nā Tangaroa	of Tangaroa
Nā Maru	of Maru
Ko Ranginui e tū iho nei	I acknowledge Ranginui above and Papatūānuku
Ko Papatūānuku e takoto ake nei	below
Tūturu o whiti whakamaua kia	Let there be certainty
tina	Secure it!
Tina! Hui e! Taiki e!	Draw together! Affirm!

MEMORANDUM
Taranaki Emergency Management

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **Confirmation of CDEM Joint Committee Minutes - 21 September 2023**

Author: M Jones, Governance Administrator

Approved by: S J Ruru, Chief Executive – Taranaki Regional Council

Document: 3252667

Recommendations

That Taranaki Regional Council:

a) takes as read and confirms the minutes and resolutions of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee held at the Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford 21 September 2023

b) notes that the unconfirmed minutes of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee held at the Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford on 21 September 2023, have been circulated to the New Plymouth District Council, Stratford District Council and the South Taranaki District Council for their receipt and information.

Appendices/Attachments

Document 3208725: Minutes Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee 21 September 2023.

Committee: Civil Defence Emergency Management – Joint Committee

Date: 21 September 2023

Venue: Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford

Document: 3208725

Members	N Walker	Chairperson
	P Nixon	Mayor South Taranaki District Council
	M McKay	Alternate Stratford District Council
Attending	S Hanne	Stratford District Council
	F Aitken	South Taranaki District Council
	G Green	New Plymouth District Council
	S Ruru	Taranaki Regional Council
	T Velvin	Taranaki CDEM (Regional Manager)
	M Jones	Governance Administrator
	O Conley	Marketing and Communication Advisor CDEM
	I Wilson	NEMA
	B Ingram	TEMO Group Controller

The meeting opened with a group karakia at 10.30am

Apologies: Apologies were received and sustained from Mayor Holdom - New Plymouth District Council, Mayor Volzke – Stratford District Council, S Tiatia – NEMA, L Poutu.

Nixon/Hanne

1. Confirmation of Minutes – Joint Committee 18 May 2023

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) took as read and confirmed the minutes of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee meeting held in the Taranaki Regional Council chambers, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford on 18 May 2023

b) noted that the unconfirmed minutes of the CDEM – Joint Committee on 18 May 2023, have been circulated to New Plymouth District Council, South Taranaki District Council and Stratford District Council for the receipt and information.

Nixon/Walker

2. Confirmation Minutes - CDEM – CEG 31 August 2023

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) took as read and confirmed the minutes of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-Ordinating Group meeting held at Stratford District Council, 63 Miranda Street, Stratford on 31 August 2023

b) adopted the recommendations therein.

Walker/Nixon

3. Quarterly Performance Report

3.1 Mr T Velvin, spoke to the memorandum to provide an update on the 2022/2023 Quarterly Performance Report. Mr Velvin advised funding has come through since the paper was submitted.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received memorandum, *Quarterly Performance Report 4 2022/23*

Walker/McKay

4. Adoption of TEMO Business Plan 2024-2025

4.1 Mr T Velvin, spoke to the memorandum to update the members on the draft TEMO Business Plan 2024-2025.

4.2 Mr Velvin emphasised that this is a living document and will adapt with change.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the Memorandum, *Adoption of the TEMO Business Plan 2024-25*

b) noted the contents of the TEMO Business 2024-25

c) approved the business plan 2024 -2025.

Walker/McKay

5. Website URL Change for Taranaki Emergency Management Office

5.1 Mr T Velvin, spoke to the memorandum to update the member's on the proposed change to Taranaki Emergency Management Office website URL

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the Memorandum *Website URL Change for Taranaki Emergency Management Office*

b) approved the proposal for the new website URL to change to 'www.taranakiem.govt.nz'.

Nixon/McKay

6. Approval of the Terms of Reference of the Geospatial Innovation Advisory Group

6.1 Mr T Velvin, spoke to the memorandum seeking endorsement to approve the updated terms of reference.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the memorandum, *Approval of the Terms of Reference for Geospatial Innovation Advisory Group*

b) approved the Terms of Reference for the Geospatial Advisory Group

Walker/Nixon

7. Appointment of Group Controller

7.1 Mr T Velvin, spoke to the memorandum to provide an update on the appointment of Mr Ben Ingram to the role of Group Controller.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the memorandum *Appointment of Group Controller*

b) approved the appointment of Mr Ben Ingram to the role of Group Controller

Nixon/McKay

8. Appointment of Zoe Sharman as Alternate Group Welfare Manager

8.1 Mr T Velvin, introduced Ms K Lawson, who spoke to the memorandum requesting the members approve the appointment of Zoe Sharman as an alternative Group Welfare Manager.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the Memorandum *Appointment of Ms Zoe Sharman as Alternate Group Welfare Manager*

b) approved the appointment of Ms Zoe Sharman, to the role of Group Welfare Manager.

McKay/Walker

9. National Emergency Management Update

9.1 Mr I Wilson, spoke to the memorandum to provide the members with an update on the National Emergency Management Agency.

Recommended

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee:

a) received the memorandum *National Emergency Management Agency Update.*

McKay/Nixon

There being no further business the Committee Chair, Neil Walker, declared the meeting of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Joint Committee closed at 11.15am.

Confirmed

Chairperson: _____

Neil Walker

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **CDEM - CEG Minutes - 26 February 2024**

Author: M Jones, Governance Administrator

Approved by: S J Ruru, Chief Executive – Taranaki Regional Council

Document: 3252659

Recommendations

That Taranaki Regional Council:

a) receives the unconfirmed minutes of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group Meeting held Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford on 26 February 2024

b) adopts the recommendations therin.

Appendices/Attachments

Document 3250426: CDEM – CEG Minutes 26 February 2024

Date: 26 February 2024

Venue: Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford

Document: 3250426

Present:	S Hanne	Strafford District Council
	F Aiken	South Taranaki District Council
	G Green	New Plymouth District Council
	S Ruru	Taranaki Regional Council
	I Chamberlain	Health New Zealand/Te Whatu Ora
	D Utumapu	FENZ
	K Davies	New Zealand Police
Attending:	T Velvin	Taranaki CDEM (Regional Manager)
	C Campbell-Smart	Taranaki CDEM (Group Recovery Manager)
	M Stewart	St John
	P Waters	NEMA
	C Scott	Ministry Social Development
	M Jones	Governance Administrator
	N Chadwick	Executive Assistant
	P Johnson	TEMO (Senior Office Manager)
	T Gordon	Ministry of Primary Industries (left meeting at 12.22pm)
	O Conley	TEMO
	S Kelly	Alternate Group Controller
	S Keegan	Agricultural Investment Services (left meeting at 12.22pm)
Zoom:	S Connolly	Ministry of Primary Industries (left meeting at 11.05am)
	J Tetlow	TOA Consulting (left meeting at 12.00pm)

The meeting opened with a group Karakia at 10.30am

Apologies: Were received and sustained from G Simmons - Health New Zealand/Te Whatu Ora, G Roper and B Dewar – New Zealand Police, S Corbett – Lifeline Advisory Group.

Hanne/Chamberlain

1. Confirmation of CDEM – CEG Minutes 19 October 2023

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) took as read and confirmed the minutes of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-Ordinating Group meeting held Taranaki Regional Council, 47 Cloten Road, Stratford on 19 October 2023.

Aitken/Hanne

2. Advisory Group Minutes

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the unconfirmed minutes of the Welfare Co-ordination Group (WCG) meeting held on 31 October 2023

b) received the unconfirmed minutes of the Geospatial Innovation Advisory Group (GIAG) meeting held on 1 November 2023

c) received the unconfirmed minutes of the Rural Co-ordination Group (RCG) on 7 November 2023

d) received the unconfirmed minutes of the Readiness and Response Advisory Group (RAGAG) on 15 November 2023.

Hanne/Green

3. National Exercise Rū Whenua

3.1 C Campbell-Smart informed members of the planned National Exercise Rū Whenua exercise.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group::

a) received the memorandum National Exercise Rū Whenua

b) noted the content of this memorandum.

Aitken/Hanne

4. Draft Farmer and Community Support plan for Foot and Mouth Disease

4.1 S Connolly and T Gordon – Ministry of Primary Industries, provided the members with an update on welfare planning for a potential Foot and Mouth out-break

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Foot and Mouth Disease Farmer and Community Support presentation from MPI

b) noted the content of this memorandum and the presentation provided.

Ruru/Green

5. Risk Assessment Presentation

5.1 J Tetlow – TOA Consulting gave an update to members on the recent risk assessment report.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Risk Assessment Report and presentation from TOA Consulting Ltd.

b) noted the content of this memorandum, attached report and presentation content.

Aitken/Hanne

6. Quarterly Performance Report Q2 2023/24

6.1 T Velvin provided members with an update on financial performance of the CDEM Group for the second quarter of 2023/24.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Regional Council:

a) received the memorandum, *Quarterly Performance Report Q2 2023/24*.

Green/Chamberlain

7. Report to Joint Committee on CEG Membership

7.1 N Chadwick informed members of the report that will be presented to the CDEM – Joint Committee meeting 14 March.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received this memorandum titled Report to Joint Committee on Co-Ordinating Executive Group membership

b) noted the contents of the report titled Appointment of members to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-Ordinating Executive Group (CEG).

Aitken/Green

8. Resignation of Simon Walkinshaw, South Taranaki District Council Local Controller

8.1 T Velvin updated members of Mr Walkinshaw's resignation from his position as South Taranaki District Council Local controller.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Resignation of Mr Simon Walkinshaw, STDC Local Controller

b) noted that resignation of Mr Simon Walkinshaw from the role of Local Controller; and

c) acknowledged the services that Mr Simon Walkinshaw has provided for the Taranaki CDEM Group in his time as Local Controller.

Aitken/Scott

9. Resignation of Ms Karen Lawson as Group Welfare Manager

9.1 T Velvin updated members of Ms Karen Lawson's resignation from her position of Group Welfare Manager.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Resignation of Ms Karen Lawson, Group Welfare Manager

b) noted the resignation of Ms Karen Lawson as Group Welfare Manager

c) acknowledged the services that Ms Karen Lawson, Group Welfare Manager has provided for the Taranaki CDEM Group in her time as Group Welfare Manager.

Hanne/Chamberlain

10. Appointment of Group Controller

10.1 T Velvin updated members on the appointment of Sandra Boardman as Group Controller.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Appointment of Group Controller.

Hanne/Green

11. Appointment of Local Recovery Manager – New Plymouth District Council

11.1 T Velvin updated the members on the appointment of Damian Clark to the role of Local Recovery Manger – New Plymouth District Council.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Appointment of Local Recovery Manager – New Plymouth District Council

b) endorsed the appointment of Mr Damien Clark to the position of Local Recovery Manager, for New Plymouth District, to the Taranaki CDEM Joint Committee.

Green/Aitken

12. Priority Fuel Stations

12.1 C Campbell-Smart informed members of the requirement to identify Priority Fuel Stations under the Fuel Resilience Amendment Act.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Priority Fuel Sites

b) noted the content of this memorandum and attached report

c) approved the Priority Fuel Sites identified in the memorandum and attached analysis report, and that these sites supersede and amend the 2019 Taranaki Regional Fuel Plan

d) adopted that the Taranaki CDEM Group Joint Committee notes the decision

e) determined that this decision be recognised not significant in terms of section 76 of the Local Government Act 2002

f) determined that it has complied with the decision-making provisions of the Local Government Act 2002 to the extent necessary in relation to this decision; and in accordance with section 79 of the Act, determined that it does not require further information, further assessment of options or further analysis of costs and benefits, or advantages and disadvantages prior to making a decision on this matter.

Hanne/Utumapu

13. Response Management System Adoption

13.1 C Campbell-Smart provided and update on progress of the establishment of the response management system DH4.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Response Management System Adoption

b) noted the content of this memorandum.

Hanne/Aitken

14. Taranaki Civil Defence Website Update Presentation

14.1 O Conley provided an update on the new Taranaki Emergency Management website.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum Taranaki Civil Defence Website Update presentation

b) noted the content of this memorandum and the presentation provided.

Green/Aitken

15. National Emergency Management Update

15.1 P Waters - NEMA provided an update on NEMA activities.

Resolved

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group:

a) received the memorandum National Emergency Management Agency Update.

Hanne/Chamberlain

There being no further business the Civil Defence Emergency Management – CEG Chair, S Hanne, declared the Civil Defence Emergency Management – CEG meeting closed with a group Karakia at 12.52pm.

Civil Defence Emergency

Management – CEG Chairperson: _____

S Hanne

Taranaki Regional Council

MEMORANDUM

Taranaki Emergency Management

Date: 26 February 2024

Subject: **Appointment of members to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-Ordinating Executive Group (CEG)**

Author: N Chadwick, Executive Assistant to Chief Executive and Chair

Approved by: S J Ruru, Chief Executive

Document: 3242680

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to streamline the membership of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Coordinating Executive Group (CEG).

Executive summary

2. Section 20 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) (the Act) dictates that CEG must consist of the chief executive from each member local authority (or a representative working on the chief executive's behalf), a senior police employee, a senior employee, volunteer or contractor of Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), the chief executive or senior member of a provider of health and disability services operating in the area and any other persons that may be co-opted by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group. A person co-opted under the relevant subsection may include a senior ambulance service officer.
3. At the Joint Committee (JC) meeting, held Thursday 18 May 2023, Taranaki Iwi representative Liana Poutu enquired about the option of Iwi representatives attending the CEG meetings. This paper is seeking support for an invitation to be extended to the Taranaki Iwi Chairs forum seeking the appointment of up to three iwi appointed representatives, should they so desire. The appointment of three iwi representatives is consistent with the number of iwi representatives appointed to the JC.
4. As a part of the preparation of this report, a review of co-opted members has been undertaken. It is proposed that the CEG membership be streamlined so that it only includes the members required under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 plus a small number of co-opted members.
5. Voting rights for CEG will remain with Statutory Members (as listed in paragraph 2).

Recommendations

That Taranaki Civil Defence Joint Committee:

a. receives the *Appointment of members to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Co-Ordinating Executive Group (CEG)* memorandum

b. discharges all current co-opted members of the Co-Ordinating Executive Group.

c. selects and approves Option 1 being to appoint a representative from Hato Hone St John Ambulance Services and the Ministry of Social Development

d. agrees that an invitation be extended to the Taranaki Iwi Chairs Forum to appoint up to 3 iwi representatives to the Co-Ordinating Executive Group should they so desire.

e. determines that this decision be recognised not significant in terms of section 76 of the Local Government Act 2002

f. determines that it has complied with the decision-making provisions of the Local Government Act 2002 to the extent necessary in relation to this decision; and in accordance with section 79 of the Act, determines that it does not require further information, further assessment of options or further analysis of costs and benefits, or advantages and disadvantages prior to making a decision on this matter.

Background

6. At the JC meeting, held Thursday 18 May 2023, Taranaki Iwi Representative Liana Poutu inquired about the option of Iwi representatives attending the CEG meetings. This paper is seeking to formalise Iwi representatives attending CEG meetings with the same speaking rights as other co-opted members of the committee. It is also an opportunity to review all co-opted members to this committee.

7. While conducting the review of co-opted members, there were instances of Taranaki Emergency Management Office (TEMO) staff being appointed as co-opted members which is not considered appropriate given the committee is responsible for the implementation of the JC decisions and commitment of resources to the agreed work plans and projects which affects the TEMO office.

Issues

8. In reviewing membership of the committee, it was identified that staff from TEMO had been appointed as co-opted members of the CEG which is not appropriate given the terms of reference of the committee and that they are responsible for implementing the decisions of CEG and the JC.

9. While the CEG and JC have approved Iwi representatives attending the CEG meetings, there is an opportunity for members to consider co-opting Iwi representatives that may be able to assist the JC with the implementation of decisions made and also provide valuable insight and knowledge into CDEM issues of importance to iwi.

Discussion

10. When considering the appointment of members of the CEG, the Act provides clear guidance on the statutory membership and, while the Act mentions appointing a senior ambulance service officer, there is scope for additional members to be appointed.

11. It is recommended that the committee consider appointing a representative from Hato Hone St Johns along with a representative from the Ministry of Social Development. Representatives from both of these agencies possess knowledge and skills that will assist the committee in their decision making.

12. At present, the chairs of various advisory groups, which in some cases includes TEMO staff, have also been members of the CEG. This has the practical effect of increasing the size of the CEG and creates a conflict with the role of the advisory groups being accountable to the CEG. The most appropriate approach would be for the advisory group chairs to provide updates to CEG as and when needed.

Options

13. Option 1: Extend an invitation to the Taranaki Iwi Chairs Forum to appoint up to three representatives to the CEG and appoint a representative from Hato Hone St Johns and the Ministry for Social

Development. This is the preferred option because it meets the statutory requirements and resolves the current CEG membership issues.

14. Option 2: Extend an invitation to the Taranaki Iwi Chairs Forum to appoint up to three representatives to the CEG. While this option will allow iwi to have representation on the CEG, it would be beneficial for representatives from the other identified agencies to also have representation.
15. Option 3: Extend an invitation to Hato Hone St Johns and the Ministry of Social Development. This option is not recommended as the Committee previously agreed to the request from Liana Poutu to extend the invitation to iwi representatives.
16. Option 4: Leave the membership at status quo. This is the least preferred option as it means that TEMO staff and officers are members of the CEG and also ignores the previously supported request for iwi representatives.

Significance

17. The JC is being asked to consider the membership of the CEG. This is a routine business manner and so a decision in accordance with the recommendation is assessed as not significant under the Council's Significance and Engagement Policy.

Financial considerations—LTP/Annual Plan

18. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the Council's adopted Long-Term Plan and estimates. Any financial information included in this memorandum has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.

Policy considerations

19. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the policy documents and positions adopted by this Council under various legislative frameworks including, but not restricted to, the Local Government Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987.

Iwi considerations

20. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the Council's policy for the development of Māori capacity to contribute to decision-making processes (schedule 10 of the Local Government Act 2002) as outlined in the adopted Long-Term Plan and/or Annual Plan.
21. This item has been developed following the request from an iwi representative on the Committee for iwi representatives on the CEG.

Community considerations

22. This memorandum and the associated recommendations have considered the views of the community, interested and affected parties and those views have been recognised in the preparation of this memorandum.

Legal considerations

23. This memorandum and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the Council.

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **Risk Assessment Adoption**

Author: C Campbell-Smart, Senior Projects Adviser – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Approved by: T Velvin, Group Manager/Controller – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Document: 3253527

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present the new risk assessment to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee for adoption, as a substantive part of the Taranaki Group Plan 2018-2023 review.

Executive summary

2. The Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group has recently begun the review of the CDEM Group Plan, a statutory requirement of the CDEM Act 2002. The review of the known hazards and the potential consequences upon the region is a fundamental part of the Group Plan process and is key to ensuring that the plan identifies how the group will reduce, mitigate and manage these across the 4R's.
3. The report is presented to the Taranaki CDEM Joint Committee for adoption. This will allow work on the Group Plan review to continue to the next stage including the administrative step of notifying the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) that the review process has commenced.
4. The consultant has recommended that further work be completed on the risk assessment process to ensure that all of the risks are fully comprehensive and moderated through stakeholder engagement. The risks that have not been subjected to this full process at this stage are flash flooding, plant pests, infectious human disease (pandemics) and major air accidents. It is proposed that these assessments will be completed by TEMO staff as resourcing commitments allow. A decision to progress them at this stage would require additional funding of $15,000.

Recommendations

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management – Joint Committee::

a. receives the memorandum Risk Assessment Adoption

b. approves the Risk Assessment Report attached in the memorandum, and accepts that a full assessment to moderate risk through a full stakeholder engagement process and determine hazard impact and consequences more fully will be facilitated by TEMO staff as resources allow

c. approves the signing and notifying by letter to the Director, National Emergency Management Agency of commencement of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan Review

d. determines that this decision be recognised not significant in terms of section 76 of the Local Government Act 2002

e. determines that it has complied with the decision-making provisions of the Local Government Act 2002 to the extent necessary in relation to this decision; and in accordance with section 79 of the Act, determines that it does not require further information, further assessment of options or further analysis of costs and benefits, or advantages and disadvantages prior to making a decision on this matter.

Background

5. The Taranaki CDEM Group Plan (2018 - 2023) came into effect on the 19th of June 2018. There is a statutory requirement for a review of the Group Plan to commence if it has been operative for five years or more (Sec 56(1) CDEM Act 2002).
6. On the 23 February 2023 the Taranaki CDEM Joint Committee approved the Group Plan review process, which commenced with public notification of the proposed review.
7. In June 2023 TEMO started the risk assessment, Toa Consulting were engaged to deliver this assessment. The risk assessment process has followed the Directors Guideline (DGL) 23/22 – Risk Assessment: Guidance for CDEM Group Planning.
8. This Risk Assessment process was updated since the last group plan review, resulting in several changes to the way in which hazards are assessed. This has included the use of Maximum Credible Event (MCE) scenarios for all hazards and a focus on the consequences across all four environments; Social, Built, Economic and Natural.
9. In preparation of this report for the Joint Committee it was noted that an administrative step was missed, namely notifying commencement of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan Review by letter to the Director, National Emergency Management Agency.

Discussion

10. The regional risk assessment was conducted in three phases:
    a. Review of regional hazards, development of MCE scenarios and likelihoods
    b. Review of hazard consequences (Regional Workshops and hazard surveys)
    c. Analysis of hazard risks using the NEMA Risk Assessment tool.
11. The attached report and accompanying presentation outline the results of the risk assessment workshops held throughout 2023 and the risk assessment surveys conducted in July and October 2023. The results of the risk assessment outlined in the report are preliminary and are likely to change as the group conducts additional workshops to further refine the assessment of consequences of hazards in the region.
12. The consultant has made the following recommendations to the Taranaki CDEM Group following the conducting of this project:
    a. Review the current results of the risk assessment to identify where further input is required from key CDEM partners to refine the results. This includes elements assigned a low confidence due to the appropriate agency or organisation not being present at the workshops.
    b. Hazards that have not been through a full workshop and appear in the risk matrix as a high risk, or a potentially major consequence to the region, should be prioritised for full assessment. It is suggested that the following hazards be assessed in full as soon as practicable:

- Flash floods.
- Plant pest / disease.
- Infectious human disease (pandemic)
- Transport accident – Major air accident.

c. Undertake the continued assessment of hazards that have not been fully assessed through the life of the Group Plan.

d. Work in partnership with local Māori and iwi to understand the specific consequences of hazards to these groups within the region.

13. The Risk Assessment report and options were discussed at the Taranaki Coordinating Executive Group meeting held 26th February 2024, and after discussion it was agreed to recommend adoption of the Assessment as is.

Options

Adopt the Risk Assessment report.

14. The advantage of this option is that it allows the Group to progress to the next stage of the Group Plan review. The Group Plan is a statutory plan under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) and is required for review to commence within five (5) years of adoption (2023).
15. The disadvantage of not completing the final risk assessments identified in the consultant report, is to potentially misrepresent the priority of different hazards for the region.

Ask for a full assessment on remaining hazards.

16. The advantage of this option is to assess impacts more comprehensively from the risks that have been recommended by the consultant for stakeholder validation.
17. The disadvantage of this option is to delay adoption of the Risk Assessment, delaying progress on review and adoption of the next version of the statutory Group Plan.
18. This option would also require additional consultant costs to complete the final assessments in a timely manner, estimated at $15,000. This will have impacts for the operating budget, with budget overspend requiring additional funding from the member councils. As the unbudgeted expenditure would need to be considered and approved by each of the member council's work could not commence until a decision had been made by each of the member council as to whether they were willing to approve this additional unbudgeted expenditure. Given the financial pressures currently on member councils there is no guarantee that the unbudgeted expenditure would be approved.

Issues

19. Iwi has not been involved in other regional CDEM Planning at this point. Agreed communication lines are through the 3 Waka.
20. Emergency management reforms, currently the Bill is before parliament. If the Bill is accepted it is likely not to take effect until the end of 2024 with a transitional period to meet requirements.

Significance

21. Approval of the Risk Assessment is a major stage of the Taranaki CDEM Group Plan 2018-2023 statutory review. Endorsement of the plan to the Taranaki CDEM Joint Committee however does not trigger Significance under the Local Government Act 2002.
22. The decision is determined as not significant as:
    a. the decision does not affect a large number of residents and ratepayers to a moderate extent.

b. the consequences of the decision do not affect a small number of residents and ratepayers to a large extent.

c. the decision does not have a history of generating wide public interest with the Taranaki region or New Zealand generally.

Financial considerations—LTP/Annual Plan

23. The recommended option is consistent with the CDEM Group's financial policies, and its members adopted Long-Term Plans and estimates. Any financial information included in this memorandum has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.

24. If the alternative option was to be adopted there would be financial costs for TEMO to re-engage with the consultant to complete additional stakeholder hazard engagement. This would have impacts on the TEMO operating budget, requiring approval from member councils for the unbudgeted expenditure.

Policy considerations

25. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the policy documents and positions adopted by Taranaki CDEM under various legislative frameworks including, but not restricted to, the Local Government Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991, Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 and the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

Community considerations

26. This memorandum and the associated recommendations have considered the views of the community, interested and affected parties and those views have been recognised in the preparation of this memorandum.

Legal considerations

27. This memorandum and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the Council.

Appendices/Attachments

Document 3253544: Taranaki CDEM Group Hazard risk assessment 2023

Document 3253539: Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan Review Letter to Director, National Emergency Management Agency

TARANAKI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

Hazard Risk Assessment

Report

December 2023 Version 1.0

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Taranaki CDEM Group

Hazard risk assessment 2023

Forward

The Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group has recently begun the review of the CDEM Group Plan, a statutory requirement of the CDEM Act 2002. The review of the known hazards and the potential consequence of these upon the region is a fundamental part of the Group Plan process and is key to ensuring that the plan identifies how the group will reduce, mitigate and manage these across the 4R's.

This risk assessment process has followed the process outlined in the Directors Guideline (DGL) 23/22 – Risk Assessment: Guidance for CDEM Group Planning. This process was updated since the last group plan review, resulting in several changes to the way in which hazards are assessed. This has included the use of Maximum Credible Event (MCE) scenarios for all hazards and a focus on the consequences across all four environments; Social, Built, Economic and Natural.

The regional risk assessment was conducted in three phases:

- Review of regional hazards, development of MCE scenarios and likelihoods
- Review of hazard consequences (Regional Workshops and hazard surveys)
- Analysis of hazard risks using the NEMA Risk Assessment tool

This report outlines the results of the risk assessment workshops held throughout 2023 and the risk assessment surveys conducted in July and October 2023. The results of the risk assessment outlined in the report are preliminary and are likely to change as the group conducts additional workshops to further refine the assessment of consequences of hazards in the region.

Acknowledgements

The contribution and support to the organising of the risk assessment process provided by Sarah Gauden-Ing (CDEM Planning Advisor) have been invaluable.

In addition, the input of CDEM Group office staff and organisational representatives from around the region in support of the development of the hazard scenarios and consequence descriptors to be used within the process have been greatly appreciated. The continued contribution of all CDEM Group Partners at the workshops has enabled a base level of understanding of the consequences of different hazards within the region and will inform future planning work.

Cover picture: View of Mt. Taranaki, courtesy of GNS Science Limited under the Creative Commons licence v3.0 - https://www.geonet.org.nz/about/volcano/taupo

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Hazard risk assessment 2023

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Introduction

Background

The Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Plan is required to be reviewed every five years under section 56 part 1 of the CDEM Act 2002 to ensure it remains consistent with the National CDEM Strategy and Plan.

As part of the plan review and development process, a risk assessment of the hazards that are present within the region is conducted. This is to enable the group to plan for the reduction, mitigation and management of known hazards and their consequences across the 4R's of emergency management; Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.

The risk assessment process used in this hazard review is provided in NEMA's Director's Guideline 23/22 – Risk Assessment: Guidance for CDEM Group Planning. This replaced the previous risk assessment process utilised for prior CDEM Group Plan development and implements the international risk management standard AS/NZS ISO 31000. This process provides a more thorough assessment of the consequences of hazards across the four environments (Social, Built, Economic and Natural) and enables a more detailed review of consequences common across a range of hazards, enabling consequence-based planning and targeted risk mitigation.

The risk assessment process that was undertaken is outlined in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1: The risk assessment process

This project was conducted in three stages:

- A review of existing identified hazards, development of maximum credible event (MCE) scenarios, likelihood of occurrence and consequence ratings
- Hazard impact assessment (Analysis)
- Assessment data collation, review and reporting (Evaluation).

This report outlines the results of the risk assessment process conducted from February 2023 to October 2023 and identifies where further work is required to fully understand the consequences of hazards present within the Taranaki Region. This report also identifies significant consequences that are present across assessed hazards within the Group and where future work to address these could be conducted across the 4R's.

Review of regional hazards, scenarios and likelihoods

Hazard identification and review

The Taranaki CDEM Group Plan 2018-2023 contains a list of regional hazards that were assessed prior to the development of the plan. Over the life of the Group Plan, the understanding of many of the major hazards within New Zealand has further developed, specifically regarding the volcanic risk within Taranaki. In order to ensure that the hazards to be reviewed truly reflects the risks posed to the region, a full review was undertaken to determine if any hazards had changed as a result of new research. The hazard review was presented to a group of representatives from across the CDEM Group to ensure there was consensus on what should be included within the risk assessment.

The final reviewed hazard list for the risk assessment is shown in Table 2 on page 5-6.

Hazard amendments from previous assessments

Some hazards that were listed in the previous group plan have been amended or removed due to the following reasons:

- The hazard is a localised risk and not deemed to present a significant risk to the region
- The hazard is similar to another and can be combined to create a single hazard title that captures the consequences of both
- The hazard is a consequence of other hazards and cannot be easily assessed independently
- The hazard is an exacerbating factor influencing the severity of other hazards (e.g. climate change) and should be assessed as part of the process across a range of hazards

Hazard scenarios and likelihoods

In order to enable the assessment of the consequences of hazards within the region, a maximum credible event (MCE) scenario was developed for each hazard as recommended within the Director's guideline. MCE scenarios are utilised in the process, as these present the largest credible scenario and would require considerable coordination and management across the 4R's. These scenarios will also encompass the requirements for response to events of a smaller scale.

In general, new scenarios have been developed for each of the hazards to ensure they adequately represent the MCE scenario. These have been developed using available research or previous similar events and where possible, these have been reviewed by experts within the field to ensure they represent a realistic maximum credible event.

The likelihood for each hazard scenario occurring have been calculated using the table on the next page. This utilises either an Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) percentage, or an Annual Recurrence Interval (ARI) to determine the likelihood of the hazard occurring. While this presents a potential likelihood for occurrence to inform the risk assessment, it does not enable potential variations where a hazard may be closer to occurring due to an extended period of time since a previous event e.g. a major eruption of Taranaki Mounga or an Alpine Fault earthquake.

Likelihood Classification	Likelihood Description	AEP (%)	ARI (Annual Return Interval) (rounded)
Rare	Almost certainly not to occur but cannot be ruled out	<0.1	>1000
Unlikely	Considered not likely to occur	0.1 - <1	>100 - 1000
Possible	Could occur, but is not expected to	1 - <10	>10 - 100
Likely	A good chance that it may occur	10 - <63	>1 – 9.5
Almost Certain	Expected to occur if all conditions met	≥63	≤1

Table 1: Likelihood of occurrence table

The scenarios developed and likelihood of occurrence for each of the hazards are shown in the Hazard summaries in the appendices on page 27. Where an AEP or ARI was available for a hazard, this was used to establish the likelihood of occurrence. Where neither of these were available from existing research, a likelihood has been assigned based on previous events within New Zealand and the Taranaki region. It is important to note that the likelihood is for the maximum credible event occurring, and not for smaller events that occur more frequently, and therefor is likely to have a larger occurrence interval.

Taranaki Hazards for assessment

Hazard	Likelihood
Natural Hazards	
Coastal hazards – Sea state (Marine waves)	**Possible**
Cyclone	**Possible**
Drought	**Possible**
Earthquake – Local fault	**Rare**
Fire – Natural environment	**Possible**
Flash floods	**Possible**
Flooding - River	**Possible**
Heatwave	**Unlikely**
Heavy snowfall (Low elevation)	**Possible**
Hikurangi subduction zone earthquake and tsunami	**Unlikely**
Slope instability – Eastern Hill Country	**Possible**
Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption	**Possible***
Tornado	**Possible**
Tsunami – Local source	**Unlikely**
Tsunami – Regional / Distant source	**Unlikely**
Volcanic Eruption – Distant source	**Rare**
Biological Hazards	
Animal pest / disease	**Possible**
Infectious Human Disease (pandemic)	**Possible**

Hazard	Likelihood
Plant pest / disease	**Possible**
Technological / Human Hazards	
Civil Unrest	**Unlikely**
Cyber-attack or technology infrastructure failure	**Possible**
Dam break/failure	**Rare**
Fire (Built environment)	**Possible**
Fuel Disruption	**Unlikely**
Hazardous Substance event	**Possible**
Lifelines - Critical infrastructure failure – Gas pipeline	**Possible**
Long term transport or roading disruption	**Possible**
Major transport accident	**Rare**
Marine incident or spill	**Unlikely**
Radiation event	**Rare**
Terrorism	**Unlikely**
Water supply contamination	**Unlikely**
Water supply failure	**Unlikely**

Table 2: 2023 Taranaki hazards list

*While the likelihood of an eruption of the scale used in the scenario for assessment is classed as 'Rare', Taranaki Mounga is in an unusually long (although not unprecedented) lull in activity. Recent research (2021) estimates an annual probability of eruption is 1-1.3%. For this reason it has been given a "possible' likelihood of occurrence to reflect recent research and the potential for eruptions of a smaller scale to have significant consequences to the region.

Consequence descriptions

In order to fully understand the likely impact of a hazard, a number of consequence descriptions are utilised to help determine the severity of impacts. These are based across four environments to ensure that all possible consequences of a hazard occurring are considered in the process.

The four environments

The four environments utilised in the risk assessment process are; Social, Built, Economic and Natural. The diagram below shows the elements that are considered within each environment when determining the consequences of a hazard.



Figure 2: The four environments

Ratings, elements and descriptors

The risk assessment utilises a severity rating to determine the likely level of consequence for elements within each of the four environments; Insignificant, Minor, Moderate, Major and Extreme.

To enable an in-depth analysis of the consequences of a hazard across the four environments, each environment is broken down further into individual elements. Descriptors of the impact at each level of severity are then developed to enable a level of severity to be assigned. A base table of elements and descriptors is provided as part of the NEMA risk assessment tool, however, these can be adapted and refined to ensure that they reflect the circumstances within the CDEM Group.

An initial workshop was held with key Emergency Management staff and representatives of key response agencies to review the table of consequences used to ensure that the elements and descriptors met the needs of the Group in conducting a thorough risk assessment. Additional elements specific to Taranaki were added into the process to ensure a full assessment of impacts to the four environments of the region.

While the consequences to Māori have been considered in the risk assessment process, specific impacts to these groups have not been identified within the consequence elements. It is the intention of the Taranaki Emergency Management team to develop these in partnership with the relevant representatives through the life of the next Group Plan in preparation for assessment as part of the next Group Plan review.

Table 3 on the next page shows the elements that were included within the assessment. The full table with impact descriptors is shown in the appendices on pages 36.

Social Environment
• Deaths • Negative societal impacts • Injuries and illness (e.g. cuts, breaks, disease etc) • Psychosocial impacts • "Emergency shelter • Displaced households • Physically isolated communities • Welfare services - emergency finance and other essential services support • Ability for Māori / iwi to provide manaakitanga • Access to essential consumer products • Education services - access to preschool, school and tertiary services • Community services - local government and not for profit community support services • Social wellbeing and connectedness - participation and inclusiveness • Cultural wellbeing - ability to participate in cultural life (including Tikanga), recreation, rituals and activities • Impacts to historical or culturally significant places and collections / taonga • Companion animals - pets, companion animals, non-production animals
Built Environment
• Damage to residential buildings • Damage to commercial and industrial buildings • Damage to government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings • Impact to marae, structures and land • Impact to rest homes and elderly care facilities • Damage or loss of access to emergency facilities impacting function (excluding health facilities) • Damage or loss of access to hospitals impacting function • Impact to potable water services (incl. water tanks and private bores) • Impact to stormwater networks • Impact to wastewater services incl. wastewater facilities • Impact to regional flood schemes - stop banks, retention dams, pumping systems • Impact to roading network • Impact to rail network • Impact to ports and airports • Impact to telecommunications • Impact to electricity supply • Impact to fuel distribution/availability • Impact to reticulated gas • Impacts to lifestyle blocks and non-primary sector properties • Impacts to waste management

Economic Environment
• Direct losses to individuals • Direct losses to businesses, commercial entities and industries • Direct losses to Māori and iwi commercial entities • Direct losses to local and central government • Losses and disruption to the region's other key economic sectors/industries/employers • Direct impacts on employment/job sector • Impact to local and regional economic drivers • Impacts to the agricultural sector (dairy, livestock and arable farming) • Loss/displacement of production livestock • Impacts to the horticultural sector (fruit and vegetable) • Impacts to agriculture sector support services (processing, agricultural equipment and maintenance, transportation) • Impacts to the aquaculture sector (fisheries, processing, transportation) • Ability for the rural sector to re-establish BAU practices • Impact to forestry sector
Natural Environment
• Air quality and associated ecosystem services • Soil quality and associated ecosystem services • Freshwater quality (ground and surface water) and associated ecosystem services • Marine environment and ecosystem services • National parks, forests and bush reserves • Impacts to iconic flora and fauna species • Impacts to significant environments or iconic landforms • Impacts to geothermal environments

Table 3: Elements used to assess consequences of hazards across the four environments

Assessment confidence

A level of confidence in the assessment of each element is determined to assist with understanding where further research of a hazard may be required to fully determine its risk. The table below outlines how the level of confidence was determined during this process. For the majority of the workshops the confidence level was set at moderate, unless there was appropriate representation from a subject matter expert, or well established impacts from previous events. All data collected as part of the hazard surveys was given a low level of confidence to denote it requires further analysis to enable more confidence in the assessment result.

	Lowest	Low	Moderate	High	Highest
Supporting Evidence	• No historical events • No scientific model	• Anecdotal information of historical events • Scientific model which could be applied with significant modification	• Historical event of similar magnitude in a comparable community of interest • Relevant scientific model available	• Recent historical event of similar magnitude in a directly comparable community of interest • Good scientific model available	• Recent historical event of similar magnitude to that being assessed in the community of interest • Highest quality scientific model
Expertise	No expertise is available	Expertise is available	Relevant expertise is used to make decision	Relevant expertise is highly influential in the decision	Relevant and demonstrated expertise available and highly influential in making the decision
Participant Agreement	Fundamental disagreement of assessment	Disagreement of major aspects of assessment	Disagreement of minor aspects of assessment	Agreement of assessment	Strong agreement of assessment

Table 4: Assessment of confidence table

Analysis of the risks

The analysis of the hazards and their consequences across the four environments was undertaken through risk assessment workshops and two risk assessment surveys.

Regional Risk assessment workshops

Four risk assessment workshops were held between June 2023 and September 2023. The impacts of nine hazards to the region were fully assessed;

- Animal pest / disease
- Cyclone
- Earthquake – Local fault
- Fire – Natural environment
- Hikurangi Subduction Zone Earthquake and tsunami
- Flooding - River
- Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption
- Tornado
- Tsunami - Local source

The workshops were attended by representatives from the following organisations:

- Taranaki Emergency Management staff
- Emergency Services and Health representatives
- District Council Emergency Management staff
- Lifeline utility representatives
- Welfare organisation representatives

- Council infrastructure staff

All elements within the four environments were discussed to determine the consequences of each hazard to the region. The workshops did not undertake the assessment of elements related specifically to Māori and Iwi, as it was felt that the development of this aspect of the process should be conducted in a less confined time span to enable more meaningful engagement to occur.

Hazard Risk Surveys

Due to the change of process utilised in this risk assessment from previous risk assessments, it was decided to utilise hazard surveys to enable some initial base data to be collected for hazards within the current list that would not be fully assessed in the workshops. This would allow some degree of analysis to occur to support the Group Plan development until further detailed assessments could be completed. This was conducted using an excel tool and combined descriptors for the consequence elements of each environment, rather than individual elements within each, as was done for the full workshop.


Taranaki CDEM Group Hazard Risk Assessment Survey

Hazards	Social Environment impact				Built Environment impact							Economic Env	
	Life Safety and wellbeing	mate accommodation n	Access to services	cial and Cultural wellbei	Damage to residential and non-commercial	Damage to commercial and industrial buildings	Damage and access to emergency facilities	Damage to Electricity services	Damage to communication networks	Damage to transportation networks	mage to 3 Waterz servic	Losses to individuals	es to businesses and ind
Earthquake (Local)	Moderate	Major	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor	Moderate	Moderate	Minor	Minor
Tsunami (Local Source)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Major	Minor	Major	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Minor	Insignificant
Fire (Natural Environment)	Minor	Moderate	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor	Insignificant	Minor	Insignificant	Moderate	Insignificant	Moderate	Minor
Severe weather - Flash flooding / Thunder	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor	Moderate	Minor	Insignificant	Minor	Insignificant	Minor	Insignificant	Moderate	Minor
Infectious human disease (Pandemic)	Extreme	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Minor	Minor	Moderate	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Animal Pest / Disease	Major	Insignificant	Minor	Major	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Major	Major
Water supply failure / contamination	Moderate	Moderate	Minor	Minor	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Moderate	Moderate	Major
Fuel supply disruption	Insignificant	Minor	Insignificant	Minor	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Minor	Major
Marine incident or spill	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Extreme	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Moderate	Minor

Figure 3: Example of hazard risk survey

In order to incorporate the results into the NEMA risk assessment tool, the survey scores of each individual were combined and an average result for each assessed element calculated. While this enables the results to be incorporated into the tool, it is noted that this is in lieu of a full assessment and may result in some wide variance in the results until each hazard has undergone a full assessment using the complete consequence elements list (see Appendices pg,36) . All hazards entered into the system from the survey have been entered with the lowest level of confidence in the assessment to ensure it is clear that these require further detailed assessment. This will be used to prioritise future workshops with subject matter experts.

The initial hazard survey carried out in June 2023 received 12 responses from eight different organisations. The second survey carried out in October 2023 only received ten responses from eight organisations. These surveys provide an extremely basic indication of where hazards that have not been fully assessed might sit within the risk matrix. The results must only ever be used as a guide for future risk assessment focus and the potential consequences of these should not be utilised for anything more until they are fully assessed through a full risk workshop. However, they can provide some indication of regional hazard risk and consequence level to inform the Group Plan development.

Risk assessment results

The current risk assessment results are detailed in the following section. It should be noted that these are preliminary assessment results and will most likely change significantly as the CDEM Group conducts more thorough analysis of individual hazards and their consequences in future workshops. While the results show the positioning of all hazards in the matrix, caution should be used at this stage of the process, as a large number of the regional hazards are yet to be fully assessed. For hazards that have not been assessed in full through a risk workshop, their current position within the matrix is only

based upon a very basic initial assessment from the survey process and this is very unlikely to represent the final position of that hazard or its potential consequences. Therefore the results shown for the hazards assessed via survey should only ever be taken as a guide for future focus of the process and cannot be taken as representative of the actual risk to the region.

It should also be noted that these results represent the risk of hazards to the entire region, not to a specific area. Therefore, some risks that would potentially have more severe impacts in a specific area may actually represent a lower overall risk, due to the limited exposure to other parts of the region. For this reason, it is suggested that the regional risk assessment is used only as a guide and that significant local risks not fully identified in this process are assessed locally and appropriately prepared for.

Analysis of elements that occur across multiple hazards is based upon data from the workshops and hazard surveys. These should only be used as an indicator at this stage in the process, as the majority of hazards have not been through a full assessment process.

2023 Risk matrix

CONSEQUENCE

LIKELIHOOD	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Almost Certain					
Likely		• Tornado*			
Possible	• Hazardous substance event • Snowfall (Low elevation)	• Coastal flooding – storm surge / erosion • Cyber attack • Drought • Fire – Built environment • Fire – Natural environment* • Lifelines failure – Gas pipeline • Slope instability – Eastern Hill Country	• Animal Disease* • Flash floods • Flooding - River* • Infectious human disease • Plant pest / disease	• Cyclone* • Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption*	
Unlikely		• Civil Unrest • Fuel supply failure • Heatwave • Terrorism • Tsunami – Local source* • Tsunami – Regional / Distant source • Water supply failure • Water supply contamination	• Hikurangi Subduction Zone – Earthquake and Tsunami* • Maritime incident / spill		
Rare		• Radiation event • Volcanic eruption – Distant source	• Dam break / failure • Earthquake – Local fault*	• Transport accident – Major air accident	

*Fully assessed consequences through risk workshop

	Critical
	Very High
	High
	Medium
	Low

Figure 4: 2023 Risk assessment matrix. Caution should be used in referring to this table until a full assessment is completed for all regional hazards.

Hazard risk levels

Each hazard has been given a risk level based on the likelihood of occurrence and the overall level of consequence following assessment. This determines the position within the risk matrix. The risk level ranges from low to critical. This enables groups to prioritise work to address the higher risk hazards, however, this should not be used as the sole basis for establishing which hazards to address and action to be taken across the 4R's. Additional factors should be considered, such as the occurrence of specific consequences across multiple hazards, or the impacts of a hazard upon a specific environment.

The work that may occur to address higher level risks includes determining the level of risk acceptance within the group and wider community, understanding and reviewing risk mitigation measures that are in place, identifying further risk reduction that can occur, preparing response arrangements and conducting further hazards research to better understand the risk and consequence from a hazard.

The use of MCE scenarios also means that there are very few hazards that can be given a likelihood level above possible, due to the ranges set out in table 1, pg. 5, and therefore it is very unlikely that any of the assessments would see many hazards placed higher than very high risk within the matrix. This does not diminish the consequences of the hazard and the risk matrix should not be the sole reference for hazard risk assessment.

The hazards shown below have been through a varying degree of assessment, from full through to basic initial placement via the hazard surveys. The colour coding below indicates the level to which these have been assessed.

Full Assessment – All consequences assessed
Hazard Survey – 18 combined consequences across 4 environments

• Animal pest / disease	**Full**
• Cyclone	**Full**
• Earthquake – Local fault	**Full**
• Fire – Natural environment	**Full**
• Flooding - River	**Full**
• Hikurangi Subduction Zone Earthquake and tsunami	**Full**
• Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption	**Full**
• Tornado	**Full**
• Tsunami – Local Source	**Full**
• Civil Unrest	**Survey**
• Coastal hazards - Sea state (marine waves)	**Survey**
• Cyber-attack or technology infrastructure failure	**Survey**
• Dam break / failure	**Survey**
• Drought	**Survey**
• Fire - Built Environment	**Survey**
• Flash floods	**Survey**
• Fuel disruption	**Survey**
• Hazardous Substance Event	**Survey**
• Heatwave	**Survey**
• Heavy snowfall (Low elevation)	**Survey**
• Infectious Human Disease (Pandemic)	**Survey**
• Lifelines - Critical infrastructure failure – Gas pipeline	**Survey**

• Marine incident / spill	**Survey**
• Plant pest / disease	**Survey**
• Radiation event	**Survey**
• Slope instability – Eastern Hill Country	**Survey**
• Terrorism	**Survey**
• Transport Accident – Major air accident	**Survey**
• Tsunami - Regional / Distant Source	**Survey**
• Volcanic - Distant eruption	**Survey**
• Water supply contamination	**Survey**
• Water supply failure	**Survey**
• Lifelines - Long term road closure	**No Assessment**

Critical and very high level risks

Currently the risk assessment shows no critical level risks within the region from the assessments.

Very high level risks

- Cyclone*
- Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption *

High level risks

- Animal disease*
- Flash floods
- Flooding – River*
- Plant pest / disease
- Infectious human disease (pandemic)
- Tornado*

Medium level risks

- Coastal flooding – storm surge / erosion
- Cyber attack
- Dam break / failure
- Drought
- Earthquake – Local fault*
- Fire – Built environment
- Fire – Natural environment*
- Hikurangi Subduction Zone – Earthquake and Tsunami*
- Lifelines failure – Gas pipeline
- Maritime incident / spill
- Slope instability – Eastern Hill Country
- Transport accident – Major air accident

Low level risks

- Civil Unrest
- Fuel supply failure
- Heatwave
- Terrorism
- Tsunami – Local source*
- Tsunami – Regional / Distant source
- Water supply failure
- Water supply contamination
- Radiation event
- Volcanic eruption – Distant source
- Hazardous substance event
- Snowfall (Low elevation)

*Denotes the hazards that have been fully assessed through workshops

Hazard consequence and risk levels

Understanding the hazards that will potentially have the highest consequence in a specific environment should they occur can support the identification of activities across the 4R's that need to be conducted. This may not necessarily reflect the hazards that present the highest overall risk to the region, or the hazards that present the highest risk to that individual environment, but represent those that will require the most coordination and management should they occur.

The risk and consequence level of each hazard to the region across all environments are shown in Figures 5 & 6 (Pages 16-17). When referring to the results the level of assessment undertaken on that hazard should be noted, as it may be based upon a limited assessment.

The risk level and consequence level of specific hazards to each environment are shown on pages 18-23. The risk level is determined by the likelihood of the hazard occurring and the level of collective consequence across all elements assessed. The consequence level is determined by the number of elements within the environment that are rated at a high level of consequence.



Figure 5: Chart showing hazard risk level across all environments



Figure 6: Chart showing consequence level of hazards across all environments

These graphs are shown larger within the appendices of this report on page 42-53.

Social Environment

The graph below shows the hazards that present the highest risk to the social environment.



Figure 7: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the social environment

The following hazards present the highest consequence to the social environment.



Figure 8: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the social environment

The following consequence elements have consistently high risk levels within the social environment across multiple hazards:



Figure 9: Consequence elements in the social environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Built environment

The following hazards present the highest risk to the built environment:



Figure 10: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the built environment

The following hazards present the highest consequence to the built environment:



Figure 11: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the built environment

The following consequence elements have consistently high risk levels within the Built environment across multiple hazards:



Figure 12: Consequence elements in the built environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Economic Environment

The following hazards present the highest risk to the economic environment:



Figure 13: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the built environment

The following hazards present the highest consequence to the economic environment:



Figure 14: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the economic environment

The following consequence elements have consistently high risk levels within the economic environment across multiple hazards:



Figure 15: Consequence elements in the economic environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Natural environment

The following hazards present the highest risk to the natural environment:



Figure 16: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the natural environment

The following hazards present the highest consequence to the natural environment:



Figure 17: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the natural environment

The following consequence elements have consistently high risk levels within the natural environment across multiple hazards:



Figure 18: Consequence elements in the natural environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Discussion

The process followed for this risk assessment utilised the Director's Guideline 23/22 – Risk Assessment: Guidance for CDEM Group Planning. This guideline provides an updated approach that conforms to the international risk management standard AS/NZS ISO 31000. Prior risk assessments had been conducting utilising a weighted and less detailed process and the differences in process may account for some variance in the results from previous iterations of the regional risk assessment.

The use of maximum credible event scenarios within the process has resulted in some variance in the likelihood of occurrence for some hazards from previous assessments. The ranges utilised within the guidelines to establish the likelihood of occurrence using an Annual Exceedance percentage (AEP) or Average Return Interval (ARI) has posed some difficulties in establishing a likelihood in a number of major hazards, in particular those with a long geological record with relatively regular return periods. Utilising scientific information to establish these is the preferred approach, however, this does not always mirror the increased likelihood of occurrence when a significant amount of time has passed since a previous event. For example, several major hazards within New Zealand are deemed to have an increased risk of occurrence due to elapsed time since a previous event, but would normally be classed as 'Rare' or 'Unlikely due to their ARI or AEP. This is true of a major eruption on Taranaki Mounga, which would normally be classed as 'Rare', but recent research has shown that the risk is greatly increased due to elapsed time since the last eruption. Failure to acknowledge this in the likelihood of occurrence may lead to misrepresentation of the risk over the short term, and in particular the lifecycle of the group plan and other regional planning cycles.

The changes in approach, in particular to the thresholds for likelihood (shown on page.5) and the use of MCE's also means that a number of hazards now have a different level of likelihood to previously. The threshold changes have resulted in some hazards changing in likelihood. In some cases the MCE has resulted in some changes to a lower occurrence level, as the likelihood of the MCE is probably lower than an "expected" more frequent event. Utilising the MCE event also means it is very unlikely that many hazards will ever have a likelihood of more than possible in the assessment process. As a result, it is very unlikely to have hazards that appear as critical risks in the final results.

A key output of this process is the understanding of consequence of hazards across the four environments. However, to get the full understanding all hazards need to undergo a full assessment process, which was not possible within the timeframe. However, four workshops were held, and nine hazards fully assessed. Some degree of certainty can be placed upon these assessments, although the results of the workshops are based upon the views of those in attendance, which varied between workshops. In some cases the absence of key personnel from some Lifeline and Welfare providers didn't enable a full and accurate assessment of the consequences of a hazard to the region. Where this was the case, the assessments have been marked as a low level of confidence in the result and the CDEM Group is encouraged to conduct further work with CDEM partners to validate the results and review the results following any events, release of new research, or as a result of any planning workshops and discussions.

While criteria to determine the impacts to Māori have been included in the process, these have not been included in the results to date. While these were discussed during workshops, the appropriate representatin was not present for them to be deemed as credible. It is the intention of the Group to assess these elements in detail with interested parties during the life of the next Group Plan to ensure that the outcomes are of real value.

Although nine regional hazards have been fully assessed at regional workshops, there are still a large number of hazards that have not been fully assessed. In order to enable some degree of understanding of the regional risks and support the prioritisation of hazards for full risk assessment, a hazard survey was utilised to provide a basic level of understanding across all hazards. This was conducted on two occasions throughout the process and has provided initial placements for the majority of hazards. However, the survey utilises a series of amalgamated consequence elements to determine the consequence level and therefor does not provide the level of detail a full assessment will. For this reason, these results should only be used as a guide and should not be relied upon as a final assessment of the risk. Focus should be placed on the hazards that have not been fully assessed and appear as high or medium risk for the region, or those that have severe consequences. The hazards that are suggested to be prioritised for further assessment are listed within the recommendations.

When referring to any of the results of this risk assessment a degree of caution should be exercised, due to the very partial completion of full assessments across the range of hazards. The results should not be the sole determination of where the focus of the CDEM Group should be placed for the next Group Plan. The results should be used as a guide to direct areas of focus for future work across the 4R's and should not be seen as the definitive list of risks to the region. The hazards listed are known hazards to the region. This assessment has not considered potential unknown or future risks to the region.

The results of this risk assessment should be further assessed to understand the current levels of acceptance within the CDEM Group partners and community, existing mitigation measures that are in place, the potential for reduction of the risk and the suitability of response planning that is currently in place. In addition, significant local risks should be identified from the process and workshopped to understand the consequences at the local level within specific districts.

Comparison to the current Group Plan risk assessment results

The current Taranaki CDEM Group Plan (2018-2023) contains a risk assessment of hazards for the region, which is based upon not only the likelihood of occurrence and potential consequence, but also the risk after reduction activities have been undertaken for the hazard. The process previously undertaken is considerably different to the process utilised within this risk assessment and includes a weighting system for major consequences, such as loss of life. However, when the priority hazards in the current Group Plan are compared to the hazards in this current assessment that appear as a very high, or high level risk, we can see there is still some correlation between the two. Variances in results are likely due to the use of MCE scenarios, changes to the likelihood of occurrence and availability of information on the potential impacts of events, particularly with several major events having occurred in the lead up to, and conducting of the process.

Priority hazards Taranaki CDEM Group Plan 2018-2023	Current risks assessed hazards with very high or high level of risk
Volcanic – Taranaki Mounga Infection Human Disease (Pandemic) Earthquake Flooding Animal epidemic Volcanic – Distant ashfall Infrastructure failure: Dam Tsunami Infrastructure failure: Water Severe storm / cyclone / wind	Taranaki mounga – Large volcanic eruption Cyclone Animal disease Flash floods Flooding – River Plant pest / disease Infectious human disease (pandemic) Tornado

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to the Taranaki CDEM Group following the conducting of this project:

- Review the current results of the risk assessment to identify where further input is required from key CDEM partners to refine the results. This includes elements assigned a low confidence due to the appropriate agency or organisation not being present at the workshops.
- Hazards that have not been through a full workshop and appear in the risk matrix as a high risk, or a potentially major consequence to the region, should be prioritised for full assessment. It is suggested that the following hazards be assessed in full as soon as practicable:
    - Flash floods
    - Plant pest / disease
    - Infectious human disease (pandemic)
    - Transport accident – Major air accident
- Undertake the continued assessment of hazards that have not been fully assessed through the life of the Group Plan.
- Work in partnership with local Māori and iwi to understand the specific consequences of hazards to these groups within the region.
- Work with relevant agencies, government departments and research organisations to facilitate research and understanding of major hazards within the region. MCE scenarios should be re-assessed, and the results of the risk assessment updated accordingly, as this information becomes available.
- Maintain and update the NEMA risk assessment tool based on the outcomes of any research or real events to ensure the assessment is truly reflective of the likely impacts of event to the region.
- Assess the current mitigation measures that are in place for identified high risk hazards and the suitability of response plans to deal with the potential identified consequences across the four environments.
- Where possible, identify reduction activities that can be undertaken to reduce the impacts of consequences that appear at a high or very high risk level across multiple hazards.
- Work with the community to increase knowledge and preparedness for the high risk and high consequence hazards within the region.
- Utilise the results from this risk assessment to inform the development of the next CDEM Group Plan objectives across the 4R's.

Appendices

Hazard scenarios

The table below shows the revised list of hazards assessed as part of the Taranaki CDEM Group Risk Assessment process.

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
Coastal hazards – sea state (marine waves)	An ex-tropical cyclone hits the North Island bringing severe gales, heavy rain, heavy swell, and a significant storm surge to the Taranaki coastline. A heavy swell alert is put in place by MetService for a combined wave of 8 meters, from a north west direction for North Taranaki. Maximum wave heights coincide with a king tide at 1800 hrs. The storm surge mobilises large debris in waves close to land and increases sedimentation in river mouths. Coastal inundation and erosion occurs on coastline exposed to the north-born waves. Five properties at the Rohutu block receive a red sticked due to damage from the event. The coastal community of Waitara East Beach is directly exposed to the heavy swell and storm surge, which leads to coastal erosion and the loss of one meter of land on beachfront properties. The erosion exposes the front edge of some septic tanks. A power pole is damaged by the event, resulting in local power outages. Residents are evacuated before and during the king tide but are able to return to their properties. The event scatters debris across the coastal environment. *Source(s):* The tiny Taranaki beach settlement disappearing before our eyes | Stuff.co.nz Erosion at Waitara East beach under the council microscope | Stuff.co.nz	Possible
Cyclone	An ex-tropical cyclone approaches the Taranaki coastline from the northwest, with sustained winds speeds of 140km/h - wind gusts of up to 158km/h are recorded at the Maui A platform, 35km off the Taranaki coast. The system is expected to coincide with a king tide. As the edge of the cyclone approaches the coastline, strong winds and major swells up to 9m begin to impact at high tide, resulting in inundation in lower lying parts of the coast and erosion of coastal cliffs and beaches – some evacuations take place in Waitara East. Heavy rain accompanies the high winds as the cyclone moves over land. Over 550mm of rain falls in a 24hr period in the eastern hill country, with over 400mm falling in just 12hrs, with intensities of more than 50mm/h experienced. Between 300 and 400mm of rain falls in other areas with intensities of 40mm/h. Hundreds of homes are evacuated. Surface flooding is experienced across the region, including in New Plymouth where many homes are flooded. Many streams and rivers flood surrounding land, including extensive flooding to parts of Waitara. Floodwaters deposit large quantities of silt and widespread damage to farm infrastructure occurs. Hundreds of landslides (including road underslips) occur in the eastern hill country, with communities isolated for weeks due to damage to key access routes, including SH3. Debris damming occurs in several river systems, resulting in flash flooding and deposition of large amounts of silt and debris when the dams fail. This flash flooding contributes to the loss of bridges and erosion of local roads in the Eastern Hill Country. As the cyclone continues over land the high winds impact power and communications networks and down hundreds of trees across the region – thousands are affected with over 600 people are without power for five days. Some homes in Central and South Taranaki completely lose their roofs and other sustain damage from the wind. The cyclone eventually moves away from the region after 36hrs. *Scenario based on Cyclone Gabrielle, 2023 and Cyclone Dovi (2022)*	Possible
Drought	Following 18 months of drought, South Taranaki has again seen below average rainfall leading into summer. It is now late March and the high temperatures and stronger than normal winds have dried out pastures and forests. Ground and surface water levels are at a record low, with water take bans and restrictions in place throughout the region and several rivers and small tributaries running dry in parts. Grass growth is increasingly impacted. The rainfall outlook suggests very little precipitation will occur through April. Drought conditions lead to MPI declaring a medium-scale adverse event for the Taranaki region to enable government support for those affected. *Source(s):* NIWA – Climate change projections and impacts for Taranaki	Possible

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
Earthquake – Local fault *Scenario verified by H. Seebeck (GNS Science)*	A magnitude 6.3 earthquake occurs on the Inglewood fault at 10km depth, resulting in 1-2m of surface displacement. The earthquake results in strong (MMI 6) to extreme shaking (MMI 8) across the region with the strongest shaking located near the epicentre in Inglewood and in New Plymouth. Earthquake shaking leads to liquefaction at Port Taranaki and on the lower reaches of the Waitara, Onaero, Urenui, and Mimi rivers. Lateral spreading, widespread rockfall and landslides occur, especially in the eastern hill country. Significant damage occurs to power lines, telecommunications cables, and gas lines near Inglewood. The road network in Inglewood and New Plymouth suffers extensive damage – users are required to use detours on alternative routes. *Source(s)* GNS report: Earthquake Hazards in the Taranaki Region, Hull and Dellow (1993). Past Earthquake Timing and Magnitude along the Inglewood Fault, Taranaki, New Zealand (Hull, 1994) Taranaki Lifelines Vulnerability Study (October 2018) GNS: Active Faults Database GNS Report: Liquefaction hazard in the Taranaki Region (Dellow and Ries, 2013)	**Rare**
Fire (natural environment)	With El Nino being the main climate driver this summer we have seen continued dry, hot weather and strong Westerly winds through the summer months this has created a high level of fire risk across the region. A major fire is burning in a large forestry block and has spread into surrounding farmland. This is burning to the North East of Waverley covering approximately 1000ha and is spreading rapidly, fanned by strong SW winds. This fire is threatening to impact the Waitotara Valley and residents have been asked to prepare themselves for potential evacuations.  A second large fire outbreak has occurred off Waiiti Rd, Pukearuhe. It has grown in size to 500ha and is expected to grow rapidly due to the strong Westerly winds and has crossed SH3 and impacted the community of Uriti. It is burning in Scrubland and Pasture. Some structures have been lost including the school. SH3 is closed and no detours are in place.	**Possible**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
	 Weather forecast – No significant precipitation is predicted for the next 10 days; Winds from the West and SW are expected to gust 60-70km/hr and fire weather conditions are expected to remain in place. Developing fires of this size • Fire of this size will burn relatively unchecked until more favourable weather conditions occur • Evacuations of life risk will be a priority. • Significant resource requirements including aerial operations, heavy machinery and significant personnel will be necessary at least 2 planning cycles (10 – 14 days). • Mop up and Final extinguishment will take weeks due to challenging terrain and high Build up Index	
Flash Flooding	Following a wet month where catchments have already received over 100% of their monthly rainfall, the Metservice issues a red rain warning for the Taranaki region – it is a public holiday. A deluge of rain shortly follows the warning. At the Cape Egmont rain gauge, downpours of 37mm/h are recorded – over a period of 13 hours the gauge records a total of 464mm of rain. Totals of 235mm in Inglewood, 221mm in Stratford and 220mm in Pātea are recorded in the event. Widespread surface water flooding occurs across Taranaki. Widespread flooding occurs in Okato, Ōpunake, and Waitōtara. Flooding deposits large quantities of silt throughout Waitōtara. Many homes and businesses are flooded, some of which are extensively damaged and uninhabitable after the event. Due to water damage Ōpunake High School and Rahotu Primary School report not being able to reopen on Monday. Parihaka is cut off from the coast, and their water supply lost. Homes become flooded, water lines broken, and culverts are damaged. Further north, the Huatoki Plaza area is closed due to flooding (especially at high tide) as commercial premises are under threat of flooding. Several properties upstream of the SH45 bridge in Oākura are flooded. Significant damage occurs to the South Taranaki District Council Road network with a number of culverts reported as damaged. Road closures occur on SH43 (Stratford), SH45 and SH3 due to surface flooding, debris, and landslides. Wastewater networks struggle to cope with the deluge. There are reports of surface flooding, landslides, and power outages in the eastern Hill Country. Flooded paddocks lead to animal welfare issues being reported around the region. *Partly Based on the 2021 Waitangi Weekend rainfall event.*	**Possible**
Flooding - River	Following an unusually wet January, a deep low moves slowly down from the north over the region leading to widespread flooding across the region including in eastern hill country and ringplain catchments. Taranaki experiences gale force winds of up to 130km/hr and heavy rain – in 24 hours the North Egmont gage (Mt Taranak) receives more than 300 mm of rain and Ngutuwera (Waitotora Catchment) receives more than 200mm.	**Possible**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
	The Waitotara River reaches 15m at Rimunui Station and the flow through the centre of the township floods many homes and businesses. Access to the settlement of Waiinu Beach, the Waitotara meat works, and inland settlement of Nukumaru is cut off by floodwaters. Access is also lost to Waitōtara Valley for weeks due to washouts and landslides. In total, hundreds of properties across the region are impacted by flooding– many residents require welfare support. Many people from South Taranaki who self-evacuate move in with family/whanau or friends in Whanganui. This event affects the Whanganui river with substantial flooding in Whanganui. Landslides occur across the Eastern Hill Country impacting over 500 hectares of land – landslides block access, damage pasture, destroy fences, and damage water supply systems. Severe gully erosion occurs. Roads servicing isolated communities in the Eastern Hill Country close for weeks due to landslide and underslip damage. Hay stockpiles are destroyed from the heavy rain and severe wind blows the roofs off several barns and properties. Severe wind also impacts power lines across the region resulting in isolated, but prolonged, power outages – over 600 people across the region are without power for over 48 hours (including eastern hill country communities). Several dairy farms are affected by the power outages resulting in animal welfare issues. Debris dams form and fail in several places – large amounts of silt and forestry slash are deposited with flood waters, flooding homes and farms in the eastern hill country. Up to 1000 hectares of plantation forest are damaged. Many businesses, schools, and ECEs close due to the flooding and power cuts. Telecommunication outages occur in the Waitotara Valley. The reticulated water supply is impacted in South Taranaki and a boil water notice released. A state of emergency is declared to manage the impacts of the event. *Scenario partly based on the 2004, 2015 and 2021 Waitangi rainfall events.* *Source(s)* *https://hwe.niwa.co.nz/event/February_2004_North_Island_Storm* A tale of two towns (waternz.org.nz)	
Heatwave	The region experiences a 2-week spell of continued high temperatures due to a high sitting over the country. Several days see parts of the region hit sustained temperatures in the early-to-mid 30's. Overnight temperatures remain warm in the upper teens and low twenties. The high temperatures result in impacts to critical infrastructure (including power cuts), animal welfare issues and endanger vulnerable persons such as the elderly. Communities are disproportionally affected. Schools and many workplaces close due to the high temperatures.	**Unlikely**
Heavy snowfall (Low elevation)	Snowfall occurs as a result of a southern weather system affecting South Island and lower and central North Island. Snowfall at lower elevations temporarily impacts farm operations (pasture coverage), makes rural road impassable and creates dangerous driving conditions – several traffic accidents occur due to the conditions. Several schools are closed temporarily, and some businesses are disrupted. The snowfall lasts for 3 days before fully melting.	**Possible**
Hikurangi subduction zone earthquake and tsunami *Scenario E max water heights correlated with tsunami evac zones + Port modelling for M 9.0*	A magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurs on the southern portion (off the southern coast of Wellington) of the Hikurangi subduction zone. The Taranaki region experiences over a minute of MMI 5-7 shaking (moderate to severe shaking). This results in slight non-structural damage to several buildings and some injuries occur. Following the earthquake, many leave tsunami evacuation areas for higher ground or head inland. Official tsunami warnings are unable to be provided due to damaged telecommunications infrastructure. The first tsunami waves arrive on the southern Taranaki coast just over one hour following the earthquake. Maximum water elevations up of to 5m occur on the southwestern coastline, inundating the yellow zone in Ōpunake and Patea. Along the northern coastline, the marine threat area and parts of the orange zone are inundated. Elevated water levels of up to 1.5m are seen within the Port – strong and unusual currents occur along the entire coastline for 24 hours following the earthquake. Operations at Port Taranaki are suspended for safety checks. All of New Zealand experiences shaking from the Hikurangi subduction zone earthquake. The east coast of the North Island and Wellington experience up to MMI 10 (extreme) shaking – these areas are also impacted by large tsunami waves. Most domestic and international assistance is sent to these areas to support the response efforts. A state of national emergency is declared to manage the impacts of the earthquake including damage to nationally significant critical infrastructure and transport hubs, disruption to fast moving consumer goods, the welfare of those impacted, and the mass displacement of people. *Source(s):* GNS Report: Hikurangi Response Plan – Developing a scenario for an Mw 8.9 Hikurangi earthquake, including tsunami modelling and a preliminary description of impacts (Power et al., 2018).	**Unlikely**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
	An assessment of subduction zone-generated tsunami hazards in New Zealand Ports. Nat Hazards 107, 171-193. (Popovich et al., 2021)	
Taranaki Mounga Debris Avalanche	Please see note above regarding a Taranaki Mounga Debris Avalanche.	
Slope instability – Eastern Hill Country	An ex-tropical cyclone storm system brings periods of heavy rain to in-land Taranaki, causing streams and rivers to rise over a duration of 3 days – a Metservice severe weather warning is in place for the region. The rainfall results in heavy downpours over the eastern hill country, resulting in heavy scouring and erosion. Slope failure results in multiple landslides and undercuts on rural roads, isolating communities (Douglas, Matau, Soldiers Rd, Makahu, Tututawa and Puniwhakau), and restricting access via long detours. Detours are required for weeks to months while remedial work takes place. Surface flooding and landslides create hazardous driving conditions. Landslides destroy hundreds of acres of farmland and create a scarred landscape.	**Possible**
Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption (Modified L1 scenario)	A series of earthquake swarms, with earthquakes of up to magnitude 5, occur in increasing intensity around Taranaki Mountaover a period of weeks. Ground deformation (on the volcanic cone) impacts lifeline utilities close to the cone including underground networks, roading, and bridges. Following several weeks of the volcanic unrest, a large, explosive eruption (sub-plinian to plinian) occurs on Mt Taranaki. The eruption is ash-bearing and results in pyroclastic flows down the maunga. Four major phases of volcanic activity follow. On Day 40, following several weeks of unrest, another explosion occurs depositing volcanic ash to the east of the volcano, and filling the river catchments on the eastern side of the maunga with volcanic debris. Vast swathes of Stratford District Council and topographic lows in major rivers become subject to lahar risk. A high rainfall episode occurs on day 50, producing voluminous volcanic mudflows (lahars) which reach the Stratford township. Large parts of the town are covered in mud and many homes are destroyed. Several months of quiescence follow (no productive volcanic activity) until after a few weeks of volcanic unrest, another large explosive eruption occurs on day 154, this time transporting volcanic ash towards New Plymouth and Urenui. On day 182, high rainfall remobilises deposited material again in the form of lahars, which extend radially from the volcano in all directions impacting New Plymouth. Over the course of the eruption, many people present to medical centres and the Taranaki Base Hospital with respiratory issues. Several moderate injuries occur, mostly from vehicle accidents and people attempting to clean ash off roofs. Fatalities from the eruption are mostly related to lahar events. Periodic evacuations occur in mostly the red and orange volcanic evacuation zones, displacing thousands of people (and companion animals) – schools and businesses in these areas are closed. The ongoing and disruptive nature of the event results in social unease and economic uncertainty for the region. Large volumes of ash are generated requiring a coordinated clean-up effort - roads, roofs and paved areas require repeated cleaning. Thick tephra causes many roofs and structures to collapse. Ash ingress affects equipment and machinery, including vehicles, near the eruption area. The wastewater networks are affected as ash forms unpumpable masses causing overflows. Three waters infrastructure is affected by ash-laden water and localised power-outages occur intermittently. Lifeline utility disruption becomes common in the region over the 182-day eruption sequence. Flights in and out of New Plymouth Airport are intermittent over the 182-day eruption. ***Please note:*** *The Modified L1 scenario from Weir et al. (2022) was used to develop the 'Taranaki Mounga – Large volcanic eruption' scenario for this risk assessment. Weir et al. (2022) notes a debris avalanche event vastly exceeds the hazard modelling and operational response capacity of scientists and practitioners respectively. For this reason, a 'Taranaki Mounga Debris Avalanche' hazard is listed, but not assessed, in this risk assessment.* ***There are no indications that Taranaki Mounga is about to erupt, however, its unbroken geological history of activity tells us that it will in the future. We are in an unusually long (although not unprecedented) lull in activity. Recent research (2021) estimates an annual probability of eruption is 1-1.3%. Current research suggests the maunga has a 50% probability of erupting over the next 50 years. For this reason the likelihood has been set as 'Possible' to reflect the heightened risk of an eruption. Even a smaller scale eruption to that in the scenario would have significant consequences for the region.* *The next eruption could take one of three possible general forms:* • *Small explosive pumice eruption* • *Lava dome eruption* • *Large explosive pumice eruption (last one AD1655) – although not likely.*	**Possible***

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
	Taranaki Mounga volcano is well monitored by the GeoNet project, and quiescent volcanoes like Taranaki almost always demonstrate unrest before an eruption starts, with warning periods likely to range between days to months.	
Tornado	A severe weather watch is in place for the Taranaki region. Several outbursts of squally thunderstorms sweep in from the Tasman Sea, resulting in a swarm of tornadoes over several days. The tornadoes touch down in Hawera, Ōpunake, New Plymouth and Bell Block Beach. The tornadoes blow off roofs, uproot trees, lift cars, and scatter debris. Debris is scattered hundreds of meters away from the tornado paths. Dozens of homes and many businesses suffer damage, many of which are extensively damaged and uninhabitable following the event. Several roads including SH 45 south of New Plymouth are closed due to fallen trees. Power cuts affect thousands of consumers - many are without power for 48 hours. *Partly based on the July 2007 tornado event*	**Possible**
Tsunami - Local source *Scenario verified by Hannu Seeback (GNS Science)*	A magnitude 7.1 earthquake occurs on the offshore Cape Egmont Fault at a depth of 15 km, resulting in MMI 5 (moderate) – MMI 7 (very strong) shaking across the Taranaki region. Slight liquefaction is observed at Port Taranaki and light to moderate damage of lifeline utilities and several river stopbanks occurs across the region. This earthquake scenario results in a 1 m displacement of the seafloor, generating a tsunami. The first tsunami waves arrive along the coastline within 15 minutes near Ōpunake. Wave heights between 2-3m are seen along the southern Taranaki coastline towards Whanganui - the largest tsunami wave heights are seen to the north and south of Patea 1-2 hours after the earthquake. Elsewhere along the southern Taranaki coastline, tsunami elevations of up to 0.5-1m occur (marine threat). Strong and unusual currents occur along the entire coastline for up to 24 hours following the earthquake. *Source(s):* GNS Report: Geologic, earthquake and tsunami modelling of the active Cape Egmont Fault Zone. (Seebeck et al. 2021) DRAFT - Taranaki Hazardscape – Tsunami (Taranaki CDEM Group)	**Unlikely**
Tsunami – regional/distant source	A magnitude 9.5 earthquake occurs in the Solomon Islands, generating a tsunami which travels towards New Zealand. Evacuations of the red, orange, and yellow tsunami evacuation zones along the Taranaki coastline take place. The first tsunami waves arrive on the Taranaki coastline 6 hours after the earthquake. Low-lying communities on the coast and in river estuaries see inundation into the red zone and orange zone (parts of the New Plymouth CBD and Port, Tongaporutu, Urenui, Onaero, Waitara, Bell Block, Oākura, Opunake and Pātea). Maximum water elevations of up to 1.5m are recorded in the Port area, with current speeds of up to 8 knots causing major damage. Tsunami activity, including strong and usual currents continue to occur for 24 hours following the first wave. *Please note: The Puysegur subduction zone (offshore (SW) from Fiordland), is a credible source for a regional source tsunami that could impact the Taranaki region. Wave arrival time from the Puysegur subduction zone may be as little two hours. Little is known about the magnitude and likelihood of a future event on the Puysegur subduction zone.* *Sources:* An assessment of subduction zone-generated tsunami hazards in New Zealand Ports. Nat Hazards 107, 171-193. (Popovich et al., 2021) Lifelines study – Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga-Kermadec trench regional sources. DRAFT - Taranaki Hazardscape – Tsunami (Taranaki CDEM Group)	**Unlikely**
Volcanic eruption – Distant source *Scenario verified with B. Scott (GNS Science)*	An eruption occurs at Mt. Ruapehu resulting in the ejection of a ~0.01 km^3 ash plume 12km into the sky above the summit. A strong easterly wind results in 1 - 5 mm of ash fall being dispersed across a large part of the Taranaki region, with areas between Stratford and Hāwera being the worst impacted. The ashfall impacts SH 43 and SH3 leading to localized disruption of the roads due to visibility and traction hazards. Some rural power outages occur in the east. *Please note: The most likely distant eruption to produce a volcanic ashfall in the Taranaki would come from Mt Ruapehu and the likelihood of a large enough eruption to have impacts 250 km away is 1:50 years ('possible' likelihood), however, to reach Taranaki region easterly wind is also required, which occurs only a small fraction of the year (scenario becomes 'unlikely').*	**Rare**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
Animal pest / disease	A number of cases of a highly infectious animal disease are detected at a farm in the region. The infected stock were recently purchased at a cattle sale. The origins of the outbreak are unknown, but it is suspected to be present in other farms within the region and biosecurity restrictions are put in place. After several months, many of the region's farms have cases of the disease present and mass culling of stock is undertaken. OR A High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) has been detected in a backyard flock of domestic chickens elsewhere in New Zealand, however authorities are unsure when or how it came to this country. A commercial free range egg laying farm in Taranaki then detects HPAI in one of its flocks. A week later it is discovered in five further poultry farms (a mix of breeding farms, and egg laying flocks) in Taranaki. The options for managing an HPAI outbreak in NZ are not yet confirmed (but are actively being planned for by Biosecurity NZ) but for the purposes of this scenario it would be credible to assume that flocks found with the disease would be culled.	**Possible**
Infectious human disease	It's summer and reports of a highly infectious disease are beginning to surface in Europe with many people reporting severe symptoms impacting their nose, throat and lungs. A number of deaths are already associated to the disease in a number of countries. A recent returnee to New Zealand from Europe begins to exhibit symptoms of the infectious disease. Several more people across the country begin to exhibit the symptoms and all are linked to a flight between Sydney and New Zealand. Following contact tracing it is found that a family on the flight who had travelled to New Zealand to attend a wedding in New Plymouth were in close proximity to the returnee, with an elderly family member falling critically ill and being hospitalised. The wedding had several hundred guests, and some now have symptoms associated to the disease. Further community cases arise with several more people admitted to hospital. It is clear that community transmission is occurring, and an outbreak is occurring within the region, however, contact tracing is complicated due to the short incubation period of the disease. Projections show many hundreds are likely to have now contracted the disease since it first entered the region, and it is expected this number will grow quickly over the coming days. An effective strain-specific vaccine is not yet available; however, the use of the anti-viral medication Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is considered to reduce severity of illness, reduce the infectious period and be useful as a post-exposure preventative measure for contacts.	**Possible**
Plant pest / disease	An outbreak of a new plant pest is identified in part of the region. After several months the outbreak has become widespread, resulting in damage to crops, fruit, and vegetables. Many other plants are impacted because of the outbreak. *(Example threats – Marmorated Stink Bug, PSA vine disease)*	**Possible**
Civil Unrest	Mass protests throughout New Zealand opposing a government decision descend into civil unrest in main centres including the New Plymouth town centre. Violence, vandalism, and looting occur across the town centre. The protestors block several roads, and the congestion disrupts commuters and bus services moving in and out of the town centre.	**Unlikely**
Cyber-attack or technology infrastructure failure	A sustained cyber-attack targeting electrical supply infrastructure leads to widespread power supply issues nationally and across the region with blackouts of 24 hours and up to 48 hours in parts. Finance systems such as banking and EFTPOS are unavailable, fuel supply at retail outlets is unavailable, and all telecommunication exchanges in the region are impacted due to power loss.	**Possible**
Dam break/failure	An unusual occurrence leads to spontaneous failure of the Mangamahoe Earth Dam, causing downstream flooding of the Waikwhakaiho River and Mangamahoe Stream. Floodwaters damage the Mangorei Power Station, reaching a maximum depth of 4.2m and arriving 22 minutes after the breach. The industrial area and suburb of Glen Avon experiences flooding 63 minutes after the breach – flooding of up to 3.4m occurs. Hundreds of commercial and residential properties are impacted by flooding.	**Rare**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
	State Highway 3 (SH3) south of the Mangorei hill is inundated, flooding cars and stranding motorists. The SH3 bridge approaches and bridge structure (Fitzroy) and the Marton-New Plymouth railway track are significantly impacted by the event (65 minutes after the failure). Low-lying local roads in inundation areas experience flooding and closures. Large amounts of debris and sediment are deposited in the river, stream, and inundation areas. Injuries and fatalities occur. *Source:* Mangorei Dam Safety Emergency Action Plan (April 2022)	
Fire - Built environment	A major fire breaks out in the tank farm area at Port Taranaki. The fire creates a plume of toxic smoke that drifts across commercial and residential areas. Te Whatu Ora Public Health issue a warning for people to stay indoors due to the risk of toxic smoke. Vehicle access to the site and bordering roads are shut to all but emergency services. Nearby businesses are closed as a precaution and shipping operations at Port Taranaki are halted.	**Possible**
Fuel Disruption	Damage to wharf infrastructure at Port Taranaki from a port/birth failure on the Newton King Tanker Terminal (NKTT) leads to rupture of the pipe terminations and spillage of petrochemical products and bulk liquids (including crude oils, liquefied petroleum gas and methanol) onto the wharf and into the harbour. Manual valving is required to isolate petroleum products within the underground pipeline between the tanker farm and port to and reduce product loss. Safety systems on the wharf automatically engage to supress fire risk and port staff are evacuated to safety. Evacuations are affected within the Port Taranaki Restricted Operations Area, including the port control room, disrupting all port operations. A Tier 2 oil spill response is initiated with by the Regional Council. Repairs to the pipe terminations are required and take 10 days to complete. The port is out of operation and condensate storage is exhausted within 5 days. Oil and gas producers are required to shut in, resulting in no production at extraction sites. Lack of supply of dry gas supplied to the North Island via First Gas pipeline triggers a Gas Critical Contingency to curtail demand.	**Unlikely**
Hazardous Substance event	A major incident at a food production factory south of Bell Block leads to an ammonia leak. Staff are evacuated from the building – several require medical attention. Traffic controls are required, and nearby businesses and residential areas are required to shelter in place until the gas cloud disperses.	**Possible**
Lifelines - Critical infrastructure failure – Gas pipeline	A large, winter storm event triggers a landslide in coastal north Taranaki (south of Mokau), leading to failure of the First Gas transmission pipeline. Pipeline failure results in a shortage of gas supply relative to demand, and a gas Critical Contingency event is declared. The Critical Contingency Operator (CCO) issues instructions to the industry designed to ensure that the balance between supply and demand is maintained, with curtailment affecting users north of the pipeline break for supply distribution networks and domestic consumers down to Band 5 (essential services, e.g., water & sewerage treatment, mortuary & cremation). Gas disruption causes large consumers (i.e. gas processing plants and gas fired power stations), industrial users (dairy factories, pulp & paper processing and steel), medium industrial and commercial (food & beverage production and manufacturing), and essential services (water & sewage treatment, mortuary & cremation) to cease for 5 days while repairs are made. The Huntly gas turbine power station is unable to produce power (17% of national capacity) during the event, resulting is rolling north island brownouts. The event impacts businesses across the country and leads to widespread disruption to the agricultural (dairy) and health sectors.	**Possible**
Long term transport or roading disruption	After a period of wet weather and small earthquakes triggers a series of landslides around the region. Taranaki is isolated from the rest of the country. It is estimated that SH3 to the north will be closed for a week due to landslides on the Mount Messenger section, SH43 may take several months to repair. A large landslide near Manawapou River has severely compromised SH3 to south with an unknown restoration time. Many local roads have been affected and there are currently no alternative routes that can be used to get in or out of the region. The principal population centres within the region remain connected, but with many local roads impacted there are a large number of isolated communities and areas, It is estimated supermarkets have at least a 3-day supply of food, it unknown how much fuel is in region. The Port and the Airport are unaffected.	**Possible**

Hazard	Scenario (Maximum credible event)	Likelihood
Marine incident or spill	An accident leads to a spill at the Tui oil field, 60 km off the South Taranaki coast. The spill discharges up to 400m^3/day of condensate* into the sea until the source of the spill is discovered and remedied. The oil spill coats almost 14 km of South Taranaki coastline in black crude oil. Widespread bird and marine life losses occur. *Natural gas condensate is a hydrocarbon liquid stream separated from natural gas. It is similar to a very light crude oil.	**Rare**
Radiation event	A stolen well logging Cs-137 source (oil and gas industry) is stolen in its shielded container (steel and lead) for scrap metal value. The thieves unwittingly dismantle the container and break the source encapsulation. Major contamination occurs at scrapyard with workers affected by contamination and external radiation. The thieves are also affected by contamination and external radiation and present at hospital suffering from radiation burns and contamination.	**Unlikely**
Terrorism	A terrorism incident occurs in the New Plymouth town centre.	**Rare**
Transport accident - Major	An ATR-72 suffers catastrophic engine failure on approach to New Plymouth Airport, crashing into the suburb of Bell Block. . The flight has a full complement of 4 crew and 70 passengers. It is unknown how many people on the ground were impacted .	**Unlikely**
Water supply contamination	The water supply to New Plymouth has become contaminated with campylobacter and several hundred people have sought medical assistance because of illness, with many others reporting illness but not requiring assistance. Aged care facilities and large processing companies/manufacturers in the township are affected. The supply is shutdown to enable a full purge of the system with water unavailable from the mains system for over a week. *Based on the Havelock North 2016 event*	**Unlikely**
Water supply contamination	The water supply to New Plymouth has become contaminated with campylobacter and several hundred people have sought medical assistance because of illness, with many others reporting illness but not requiring assistance. Aged care facilities and large processing companies/manufacturers in the township are affected. The supply is shutdown to enable a full purge of the system with water unavailable from the mains system for over a week. *Based on the Havelock North 2016 event*	**Unlikely**
Water supply failure	A lahar event impacting the Waiwhakaiho River leads to the damage of intake structures on the Mangorei Dam (the intake lake for New Plymouth's water supply), resulting in no supply for a week until the damage is repaired. Residential, commercial, industrial, and community facilities (including medical centres and the Hospital) are impacted - alternative potable water sources are required.	**Unlikely**
Water supply failure	A lahar event impacting the Waiwhakaiho River leads to the damage of intake structures on the Mangorei Dam (the intake lake for New Plymouth's water supply), resulting in no supply for a week until the damage is repaired. Residential, commercial, industrial, and community facilities (including medical centres and the Hospital) are impacted - alternative potable water sources are required.	**Possible**

Consequence rating descriptors - Full Assessment elements

	Base Descriptors				
	No impact or negligible impact on people and/or social wellbeing	Minor impact on people and/or social wellbeing	Moderate impact on people and/or social wellbeing	Major impact on people and/or social wellbeing	Extreme impact on people and/or social wellbeing.
Rating	**Insignificant**	**Minor**	**Moderate**	**Major**	**Extreme**
Social Environment - considerations: scale, duration and recoverability					
Deaths	No deaths	Number of deaths can be managed within local BAU capacity and capability	Number of deaths exceeds BAU capacity and capability. Requires District support to increase capacity and capability	Number of deaths exceeds District capacity and capability. Requires Regional support to increase capacity and capability	Number of deaths exceeds Regional capacity and capability. Requires National support to increase capacity and capability
Negative Societal Impacts	No impact	Event is likely to have minimal negative societal impact	Event is likely to have short term negative societal impact	Event is likely to have medium term negative societal impact	Event is likely to have Long term or permanent negative societal impact
Injuries and illness (*e.g. Cuts, breaks, disease etc)*	No significant change in illnesses and injuries	Noticeable short-term rise in numbers of people affected	Many affected, short-term recovery for all	Many affected. Long recovery for some, short-term recovery for most	Many affected. Permanent impacts on some people, long recovery for many
Psychosocial impacts *(includes GPs, counselling, online services, day-to-day door-by-door action, food, community support, violence in community & mental health support)*	No significant change in demand for services	Noticeable increase in demand, manageable within available local services	Demand exceeds available local services, support from other areas of region required; increased service demand in the short term with short term recovery for most	Demand exceeds available services within region, requiring support from neighbouring regions. Increased service demand in the medium term with reduced access; short term recovery for many, long term recovery for some	Demand exceeds available services within the region requiring national support. Increased service demand in the long term with long term reduced access; Long term recovery for many
Emergency Shelter (temporary shelter for persons affected by the emergency which does not require occupants to sign leases or occupancy agreements.)	No emergency shelter required	Some, localised emergency shelter required	Widespread emergency shelter required	Widespread emergency shelter required that exceeds District capacity and capability. Requires Regional support to increase capacity and capability.	Widespread emergency shelter required within multiple districts that exceed Regional capacity and capability. Requires National support to increase capacity and capability.
Displaced households (e.g. Ability to continue living in home / area post event – Long term evacuation / temporary accommodation / orange and red zones / managed retreat)	Negligible displacement	Displacement of households can be managed within the impacted area.	Displacement of households requires support from other areas within the district.	Displacement of households requires support from other areas within the region.	Permanent displacement of households requiring support from other regions.

Physically Isolated Communities (Refers to communities who are physically isolated and require welfare delivery until normal or temporary access is restored. Includes uncontactable areas, air access only and high mobility vehicles access).	No impact	Limited impact with limited access for heavy vehicles. Light vehicles accessible.	Some impact with access limited to high mobility access vehicles only (i.e. Unimog, 4WD etc).	Physical isolation within a single district that exceeds District capacity and capability. Requires Regional support to increase capacity and capability.	Physical isolation within multiple districts that exceed Regional capacity and capability. Requires National support to increase capacity and capability.
Welfare services - emergency finance and other essential services support	No increase in demand	Noticeable short-term rise in demand	Widespread short-term rise in demand	Widespread medium term rise in demand	Widespread, long term increase in demand
Access to essential consumer products	No impact on supply	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term disruptions	Widespread short to medium term disruptions	Widespread, long term disruption, loss of some supply chains
Ability for Māori / iwi to provide Manaakitanga	No Impact	Manaakitanga is able to be provided with some short term restrictions	Ability to connect and provide manaakitanga is reduced or not possible in the short term (weeks)	Ability to connect and provide manaakitanga is reduced or not possible in the medium term (Several months)	Ability to connect and provide manaakitanga is reduced or not possible in the long term (Many months to years)
Education services - access to preschool, school and tertiary services	No impact on services	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruption	Widespread short to medium term service disruption	Widespread, long term service disruption
Community services - local government and not for profit community support services	No impact on services	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short-term service disruptions	Widespread short-medium term service disruption	Widespread, long term service disruption
Social wellbeing and connectedness - participation and inclusiveness	No Impact	Some communities affected for a short time	Many communities affected for a short time	Widespread impact on communities, medium term, some connections lost	Communities permanently lost, many communities disconnected/lose participation long-term
Cultural wellbeing - ability to participate in cultural life (including Tikanga), recreation, rituals and activities	No Impact	Cultural life, rituals and activities are able to be practiced with some restrictions	Ability to connect and practise cultural life, rituals and activities is reduced or not possible in the short term (weeks)	Ability to connect and practise cultural life, rituals and activities is reduced or not possible in the medium term (Several months)	Ability to connect and practise cultural life, rituals and activities is reduced or not possible in the long term (years)
Impacts to historical or culturally significant places and collections / taonga	No impact	Short term loss of access to, or use of a place or site of historical or cultural significance **and / or** Some isolated minor damage to taonga, historical artifacts or records	Medium term loss of access, or use of a place or site of historical or cultural significance **and / or** Some isolated significant damage to taonga, historical artifacts or records	Long term loss of access, or use of a place or site of significance historical or cultural significance **and / or** Widespread significant damage to or isolated permanent loss of taonga, historical artifacts or records	Total loss of connection to multiple locations and sites of significance historical or cultural significance **and / or** Widespread permanent loss of taonga, historical artifacts or records
Companion animals - pets, companion animals, non-production animals	No impact	Number of companion animals lost, killed or abandoned and unable to be reunited with owners can be managed within the impacted area.	Number of companion animals lost, killed or abandoned and unable to be reunited with owners requires support from other areas within the district.	Number of companion animals lost, killed or abandoned and unable to be reunited with owners requires support from other areas of the region.	Number of companion animals lost, killed or abandoned and unable to be reunited with owners requires support from neighbouring regions.

	No impact or negligible impact on structures and the services/functions they provide	Minor impact on structures and the services/functions they provide	Moderate impact on structures and the services/functions they provide	Major impact on structures and the services/functions they provide	Extreme impact on structures and the services/functions they provide
	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Built Environment considerations: scale, duration, ability to relocate function/service and recoverability					
Damage to residential buildings	No Impacts	Isolated non-critical damage of residential buildings in a township or district	Widespread non-critical damage of residential buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damaged of residential buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damage of residential buildings across multiple districts or the entire region
Damage to commercial & industrial buildings	No Impacts	Isolated non-critical damage of commercial and industrial buildings in a township or district	Widespread non-critical damage of commercial and industrial buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damaged of commercial and industrial buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damage of commercial and industrial buildings across multiple districts or the entire region
Damage to government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings *e.g. sports halls, community halls, libraries etc*	No Impacts	Isolated non-critical damage of government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings in a township or district	Widespread non-critical damage of government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damaged of government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings in a township or district	Widespread critical damage of government and non-commercial (community facilities) buildings across multiple districts or the entire region
Impacts to marae, structures and land	No Impacts	Some marae have suffered non-critical damage and are still fully operational	Some marae are critically damaged but most are useable within limitations	Many marae have suffered critical damage and are not useable without significant repair	Many marae have suffered critical damage and are unusable or require relocation
Impacts to lifestyle blocks and non-primary sector properties	No Impacts	Isolated damage of some rural properties and lifestyle blocks	Widespread damage of rural properties and lifestyle blocks in a district	Widespread critical damaged of rural properties and lifestyle blocks in a district	Widespread critical damage of rural properties and lifestyle blocks across the Region
Impact to Rest homes and elderly care facilities	No Impacts	Isolated non-critical damage of Rest homes and elderly care facilities in a township or district	Widespread non-critical or Isolated critical damage of Rest homes and elderly care facilities in a township or district	Widespread non-critical and isolated critical damaged of Rest homes and elderly care facilities in a township or district	Widespread critical damage of Rest homes and elderly care facilities across multiple districts or the entire region
Damage or loss of access to emergency facilities, impacting function (excluding health facilities)	No impacts	Localised non-critical damage and still functional with minor disruption to service times or area cover	Widespread non-critical damage and still functional with minor disruption to service times or area cover	Widespread critical damaged with major impacts to services times or area cover	Permanent total loss of facilities with significant regionwide disruption to service times or area cover. Long-term temporary solutions required during rebuild.
Damage or loss of access to hospitals impacting function	No impacts	Facilities have suffered non-critical damage & are still operational	Facilities have suffered non-critical damage - Still operational with moderate service delivery impact – non-acute services impacted for short duration	Facilities have suffered critical damage to parts - Still operational, but with major service delivery impact i.e. critical services have reduced capacity	Facilities have suffered critical damage with critical service delivery impact – loss of full hospital, & or complete loss of critical service i.e. ICUs, E.D, theatres

Impacts to potable water services (inc. Water tanks and private bores)	Negligible impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impact to stormwater networks	No Impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impacts to Wastewater services inc. Wastewater facilities	No Impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impacts to regional flood schemes - stop banks, retention dams, pumping systems	No impacts	Isolated non-critical damage to part of the flood scheme	Short term critical damage to part of the flood scheme	Long term critical damage to part of the flood scheme	Long term critical damage to multiple parts of the flood scheme
Impacts to roading network	Negligible impacts	Short term minor closures	Short term minor closures and/or critical link closure	Medium term closures, including critical links	Long term critical closures
Impacts to rail network	Negligible impacts	Short term minor closures	Short term minor closures and/or critical link closure	Medium term closures, including critical links	Long term critical closures
Impacts to Ports and Airports	Negligible impacts	Temporary disruption/closures	Short term disruption and/or temporary major hub closure	Major hub - Medium term disruption/closure	Major hub - Long term disruption
Impacts to Telecommunications	Negligible impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impacts to Electricity Supply	Negligible impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impacts to Fuel Distribution/Availability	Negligible impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption/closure
Impacts to Reticulated Gas	Negligible impacts	Isolated and short term disruption	Multiple short term service disruptions	Widespread short to medium term service disruptions	Widespread, long term service disruption
Impacts to waste management	Negligible impacts	Isolated & short term increase in waste not affecting BAU services	Increased waste generation requires regional coordination to manage	Waste generation requires new storage sites to enable disposal	Waste generation requires national support to manage

	No impact or some local impact to the economy and financial systems	Minor impact on the regional economy and financial systems	Moderate impact on the regional economy and financial systems	Major impact on the regional economy and financial systems	Extreme impact on the regional economy and financial systems
	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Economic Environment considerations: scale, duration and recoverability					
Direct losses to Individuals	No impact	A small number of people affected with minimal financial losses	Many individuals with financial losses	Many people affected, with large financial losses	Whole of community impacts with large financial losses
Direct losses to Businesses, Commercial entities and Industries	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failure	Long-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and/or widespread business failure
Direct losses to Māori and iwi commercial entities	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output and/or localised failure	Long-term loss of value/ output and/or several localised failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and/or widespread business failure
Direct losses to Local and Central Government	No impact	Short-term increases in costs	Medium term increase in costs, minimal loss of assets	Long term increases in costs, some loss of assets	Long term costs increases, and significant loss of asset value
Losses and disruption to the Region's Key Economic Sectors/Industries/Employers	No Impact	Short term loss of output for a key sector	Medium term loss of output for a key sector	Long term loss/closure of a key sector	Permanent closure of key economic sector(s)
Direct impacts on employment/job sector	No Impact	Short-term disruption to employment	Medium-term reduction in employment	Medium to long term reduction in employment	Widespread, permanent job losses
Impact to local and regional economic drivers	No impact to local / regional economic drivers	Short term impact to local economic drivers not affecting Gross Regional Product	Long term impact to local economic drivers affecting Gross Regional Product	Long term impact to regional economic drivers affecting Gross Regional Product	Long term impact to Regional economic drivers affecting Gross National Product
Impacts to the agricultural sector (dairy, livestock and arable farming)	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output	Long-term loss of value/ output and several localised farm failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and widespread farm failures
Loss / displacement of production livestock	No impact	Loss of production animals but able to be restocked within local capacity.	Stock losses exceed local capacity and capability. Requires District wide support	Stock losses exceed District capacity and capability and requires Regional support	Stock losses exceeds Regional capacity and capability and requires National support. Or Significant disruption to national or international food chain.
Impacts to the horticultural sector (Fruit and vegetable)	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output	Long-term loss of value/ output and several localised farm failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and widespread farm failures
Impacts to agriculture sector support services (processing, agricultural equipment and maintenance, transportation)	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failure	Long-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and/or widespread business failure

Impacts to the Aquaculture sector (fisheries, processing, transportation)	No impact	Short term disruption and/or minimal impact to profitability	Medium-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failure	Long-term loss of value/ output and/or localised business failures	Permanent loss of value/ output and/or widespread business failure
Ability for the rural sector to re-establish BAU practices	No impact	Minor impacts to BAU practices requiring minimal effort or investment to re-establish	BAU practices are affected and require investment and planning to re-establish	BAU practices are widely impacted and require significant investment and planning to re-establish	BAU practices are severely impacted and unable to be re-established

	No impact on the natural environment and the ecosystem services provided	Minor impact on the natural environment and the ecosystem services provided	Moderate impact on the natural environment and the ecosystem services provided	Major impact on the natural environment and the ecosystem services provided	Extreme impact on the natural environment and the ecosystem services provided
	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Natural Environment considerations: scale, duration, recoverability, iconic nature					
Air quality and associated ecosystem services	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Sustained localised impact, or widespread short-term impact	Widespread, harmful degradation of air quality	Permanent, harmful degradation of air quality
Soil quality and associated ecosystem services	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Sustained localised impact, or widespread short-term impact	Widespread, degradation of soil quality and loss of ecosystem services	Permanent, degradation of soil quality and loss of ecosystem services
Freshwater quality (ground and surface water) and associated ecosystem services	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Sustained localised impact, or widespread short-term impact	Widespread degradation of water quality	Permanent degradation of water quality, harmful to aquatic life
Marine environment and ecosystem services	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Sustained localised impact, or widespread short-term impact	Widespread loss or degradation of the marine environment	Permanent loss or degradation of the marine environment, harmful to marine life
National parks, forests and bush reserves	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Widespread impacts to forest and bush, medium-term recovery	Widespread impacts on forest and bush - long-term recovery	Permanent widespread loss of forest and bush
Impacts to iconic flora and fauna species	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Sustained localised impact, or widespread short-term impact	Loss species within region, recoverable	Permanent, widespread loss of species
Impacts to significant environments or iconic landforms	No impact	Temporary, localised impact	Minor damage to iconic landforms and/or medium-term loss of significant environments	Damage to iconic landforms and/or long-term loss of significant environments	Destruction of iconic landforms and/or permanent loss of significant environments
Impact to Mahinga Kai and customary resource gathering	No Impact	Short term loss of access or use of sites and /or minor degradation of sites for Mahinga Kai or customary resource gathering	Medium term loss of access or use of sites and /or degradation of sites for Mahinga Kai or customary resource gathering	Long term loss of access or use of sites and widespread degradation of sites for Mahinga Kai or customary resource gathering	Total loss of sites for Mahinga Kai or customary resource gathering
Impacts to Wahi-Tapu	No impact	Short term loss of access, or use of a place or site of significance to Māori, whānau, hapū or iwi	Medium term loss of access, or use of a place or site of significance to Māori, whānau, hapū or iwi	Long term loss of access, or use of a place or site of significance to Māori, whānau, hapū or iwi	Total loss of connection to multiple locations and sites of significance to Māori, whānau, hapū or iwi

Individual environment graphs

Social Environment – Risk level



Figure 7: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the social environment

Social Environment – Consequence level



Figure 8: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the social environment

Social environment – High level risk occurrence across multiple hazards



Figure 9: Consequence elements in the social environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Built environment – Risk levels



Figure 10: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the built environment

Built environment – consequence levels



Figure 11: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the built environment

Built environment – High level risk occurrence across multiple hazards



Figure 12: Consequence elements in the built environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Economic Environment – Risk levels



Figure 13: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the built environment

Economic environment – Consequence levels



Figure 14: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the economic environment

Economic environment – High level risk occurrence across multiple hazards



Figure 15: Consequence elements in the economic environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

Natural environment – Risk levels



Figure 16: Chart showing risk level of hazards to the natural environment

Natural environment – Consequence levels



Figure 17: Hazards that present the highest consequence to the natural environment

Natural environment – High level risk occurrence across multiple hazards



Figure 18: Consequence elements in the natural environment with the highest occurrence across all hazards

References

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- An assessment of subduction zone-generated tsunami hazards in New Zealand Ports. Nat Hazards 107, 171-193. (Popovich et al., 2021)
- DGL 23/20 Risk assessment: Guidance for CDEM Group Planning (Draft Version) ISBN 978-0-478-43527-6 Published by the National Emergency Management Agency
- Final report: Understanding ashfall hazards from a future eruption at Taupo caldera (EQC Project 16/724)
- GNS report: Earthquake Hazards in the Taranaki Region, Hull and Dellow (1993).
- GNS Report: Liquefaction hazard in the Taranaki Region (Dellow and Ries, 2013)GNS Report: Geologic, earthquake and tsunami modelling of the active Cape Egmont Fault Zone. (Seebeck et al. 2021)
- GNS Report: Review of Tsunami Hazard in New Zealand (2013, 2021)
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- Hikurangi Response Plan – Developing a scenario for an Mw 8.9 Hikurangi earthquake, including tsunami modelling and a preliminary description of impacts - GNS Science Consultancy Report 2018/168 September 2018
- Lifelines study – Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga-Kermadec trench regional sources.
- Mangorei Dam Safety Emergency Action Plan (April 2022)
- NIWA – Climate change projections and impacts for Taranaki
- Past Earthquake Timing and Magnitude along the Inglewood Fault, Taranaki, New Zealand (Hull, 1994)
- Review of Tsunami Hazard and Risk in New Zealand (Berryman et al. 2005)
- Stirling, M. W., & Wilson, C. J. N. (2002). Development of a volcanic hazard model for New Zealand: First approaches from the methods of seismic hazard analysis. Bulletin for the New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineering, 35, 266–277.
- Taranaki CDEM Group Plan 2018-2023
- Taranaki Lifelines Vulnerability Study (October 2018)

TARANAKI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

New Plymouth District Council
Attn: Taranaki Emergency Management Office
Private Bag 2025
New Plymouth 4340

6 March 2024

Dave Gawn
Chief Executive Officer
National Emergency Management Agency
P. o. Box 5010 Wellington 6140
By email: dave.gawn@nema.govt.nz

Dear Dave,

Ref: Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan Review

This letter is to formally advise you that a review of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan has commenced in accordance with the legislative requirements under Section 56(I) of the Act.

Public notification of the review has occurred, and we will undertake public consultation in 2024.

Yours sincerely

Neil Walker
Chair, Joint Committee for
Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

MEMORANDUM
Taranaki Emergency Management

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **Resignations of Statutory CDEM appointments**

Author: T Velvin, Group Manager/Controller – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Approved by: T Velvin, Group Manager/Controller – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Document: 3253247

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the Joint Committee of the resignation of two CDEM Statutory appointments.
   1.1. Mr Simon Walkinshaw as the Local Controller for South Taranaki District Council (STDC)
   1.2. Ms Karen Lawson as the Group Welfare Manager.

Executive summary

2. The Joint Committee approved the appointment Mr Simon Walkinshaw as a Local Controller on 21 May 2010.
3. Mr Simon Walkinshaw has resigned as local Controller, effective 14 March 2024 .
4. The Joint Committee approved the appointment of Ms Karen Lawson as Group Welfare Manager on the 3 December 2020.
5. Ms Karen Lawson resigned as Group Welfare Manager, effective 18 January 2024.

Recommendations

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management - Joint Committee:

a) receives the memorandum Resignations of Statutory Civil Defence Emergency Management Appointments

b) accepts the resignations of Mr Simon Walkinshaw from the role of Local Controller and Ms Karen Lawson as the Group Welfare Manager

c) acknowledges the services that both Mr Simon Walkinshaw and Ms Karen Lawson have provided for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group.

Background

6. The position of Local Controller, is appointed by the CDEM Group under Section 27 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002
Mr Simon Walkinshaw has resigned from this position of Local Controller, effective 14 March 2024

7. The position of Group Welfare Manager is made by the CDEM Group in accordance with Section 62(6) of the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015. Decision-making considerations
   Ms Karen Lawson resigned as Group Welfare Manager, effective 18 January 2024.

Financial considerations—LTP/Annual Plan

8. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the CDEM Group's financial policies, and its members adopted Long-Term Plans and estimates. Any financial information included in this memorandum has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.

Policy considerations

9. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the policy documents and positions adopted by Taranaki CDEM under various legislative frameworks including, but not restricted to, the Local Government Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991, Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 and the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

Legal considerations

10. This memorandum and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the CDEM Group listed in Section 17(3) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the Council.

MEMORANDUM

Taranaki Emergency Management

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **Appointments of Statutory Positions for the Taranaki CDEM Group**

Author: T Velvin, Group Manager/Controller – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Approved by: T Velvin, Group Manager/Controller – Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Document: 3253157

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to approve the appointments of:
   1.1. Mr Rob Haveswood to the role of Local Controller, South Taranaki District Council
   1.2. Mr Damien Clark to the role of Local Recovery Manager to New Plymouth District
   1.3. Mrs Sandra Boardman to the role of Group Controller to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group.

Executive summary

2. The Joint Committee has previously made appointments of the following positions under Section 27, of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.
3. This memorandum is to receive and approve the appointments of:
   3.1. Mr Rob Haveswood to the role of Local Controller, South Taranaki District Council
   3.2. Mr Damien Clark to the role of Local Recovery Manager to New Plymouth District
   3.3. Mrs Sandra Boardman to the role of Group Controller to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group.

Recommendations

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management - Joint Committee:

a) receives the memorandum Appointments of Statutory Positions for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

b) approves the applications of:

   1. Mr Rob Haveswood to the role of Local Controller, South Taranaki District Council
   2. Mr Damien Clark to the role of Local Recovery Manager to New Plymouth District
   3. Mrs Sandra Boardman to the role of Group Controller to the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group.

Background

Role of Local Controller

4. The role of the Local Controller is to direct and coordinate local CDEM resources made available to them during declared emergencies and perform any other functions delegated by the CDEM Group. A Local Controller can also use CDEM arrangements outside of declared emergencies, but some powers under the CDEM Act 2002 can only be used during a declared state of emergency.

Role of Local Recovery Manager

5. A Local Recovery Manager coordinates and facilitates immediate, medium and long-term recovery activities. Recovery Managers can be appointed at National, Group and Local level.

   Group Recovery Managers are a statutory role. CDEM Groups must appoint a suitably qualified and experienced person to be a Group Recovery Manager and may also appoint one or more Local Recovery Managers.

Role of Group Controller

6. The role of the Group Controller is to direct and coordinate CDEM resources made available to them during declared emergencies and perform any other functions delegated by the CDEM Group. A Controller can also use CDEM arrangements outside of declared emergencies, but some powers under the CDEM Act 2002 can only be used during a declared state of emergency.

   The primary role of the Group Controller during a response are to direct and coordinate the use of the personnel, material, information, services, and other resources made available by departments, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, and other persons.

Issues

7. No significant issues have been identified with these appointments under the CDEM Act 2002.

Discussion

8. South Taranaki District Council have nominated Mr Rob Haveswood Group Manager Community Services at South Taranaki District Council to the position of Local Controller. The Application Form is attached as Appendix 1.
9. New Plymouth District Council have nominated Mr Damien Clark for the position of Local Recovery Manager for New Plymouth District.
10. The TEMO have nominated Mrs Sandra Boardman for the position of Group Controller

All these appointments meet the requirements of a Local Controller, Local Recovery Manager and Group Controller, as detailed in the Statutory Appointment Checklist.

Options

11. Approve the recommendations building capability and capacity across the Taranaki Emergency Management sector enabling response and recovery during adverse events.
12. Not approve the recommendations which will jeopardise the Taranaki Emergency Management sectors ability to response and perform recovery operations to adverse events.

Significance

Local Controller

13. The CDEM Act 2002 states that the Taranaki CDEM Group may appoint one or more Local Controllers:

    27 Appointment of Local Controllers

(1) A Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may appoint 1 or more persons to be a Local Controller, and direct that person or persons to carry out any of the functions and duties of, or delegated to, the Group Controller of the Group and to exercise the powers of Controllers in the area for which the Group Controller is appointed, including, but not limited to, the powers in sections 86 to 94.

(2) Despite anything in subsection (1), a Local Controller must follow any directions given by the Group Controller during an emergency.

Local Recovery Manager

14. The CDEM Act 2002 states that the Taranaki CDEM Group may appoint one or more Local Recovery Managers:

30 Appointment of Local Recovery Managers

14.1. A Civil Defence Emergency Management Group may appoint, either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, 1 or more suitably qualified and experienced persons to be a Local Recovery Manager, and direct that person or those persons to perform any of the functions and duties of, or delegated to, the Group Recovery Manager of the Group and to exercise the powers of the Group Recovery Manager in the area for which the Group Recovery Manager is appointed, including, but not limited to, the powers in sections 94H, 94I, and 94K to 94N.

14.2. Despite anything in subsection (1), a Local Recovery Manager must follow any directions given by the Group Recovery Manager during a transition period.

Group Controller

15. The CDEM Act 2002 states that the Taranaki CDEM Group may appoint one or more Group Controllers:

26 Appointment of Group Controllers

15.1. A Civil Defence Emergency Management Group must appoint, either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, a suitably qualified and experienced person to be the Group Controller for its area.

15.2. A Group must appoint, either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person to be the person or persons who are to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Controller on the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of Group Controller or the absence from duty of the Group Controller for any reason, for the duration of the vacancy or absence.

15.3. A Group may, at any time, remove from office or replace a Group Controller appointed under subsection (1) or (2).

15.4. A Group may:

(a) delegate the authority to replace the Group Controller during a state of emergency with a person appointed under subsection (2) to 1 or more of the representatives who are authorised under section 25(1) to declare a state of emergency for that group area; and reprinted as at 1 June 2018 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 Part 2 s 26 27

(b) impose limitations on the circumstances in which the authority delegated under paragraph (a) may be used.

Financial considerations—LTP/Annual Plan

16. Any financial impacts for appointing Local Controllers are the responsibility of the appointing District Council, therefore in this instance South Taranaki District Council.

17. Any financial impacts for appointing Local Recovery Managers are the responsibility of the appointing District Council, therefore in this instance New Plymouth District Council in this instance.

18. Any financial impacts for appointing Group Controllers are the responsibility of the appointing CDEM Group, therefore in this instance TEMO. This appointment fits within current TEMO budget allocations.

19. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the CDEM Group's financial policies, and its members adopted Long-Term Plans and estimates. Any financial information included in this memorandum has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.

Policy considerations

20. These appointments are consistent with Taranaki CDEM Group Plan and the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) v3.

21. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the policy documents and positions adopted by this Council under various legislative frameworks including, but not restricted to, the *Local Government Act 2002*, the *Resource Management Act 1991, Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987* and the *Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002*.

Legal considerations

22. The Appointment of Local Controllers is made in accordance with Section 27(1) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

23. The Appointment of Local Recovery Manager is made in accordance with Section 30 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

24. The Appointment of Group Controllers is made in accordance with Section 26 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

25. This memorandum and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the CDEM Group listed in Section 17(3) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the Council.

26. Appendices/Attachments

Document 3253375: Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role application form, Mr Rob Haveswood

Document 3253310: Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role application form, Mr Damien Clark

Document 3253353: Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role application form, Mrs Sandra Boardman

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role Application Form

Applicant Name:	**Rob Haveswood**
Role Applied for:	**Local Controller South Taranaki District Council**

Employer Approval			
Manager Name	**Fiona Aitken**		
Signature		**Date**	**20 September 2023**
I endorse the application of [name of applicant] to the role of [Local/Group Controller/Recovery Manager] We note that this person will have a role in a response and/or recovery as a Controller/Recovery Manager and have ensured that that they can be made available to the EOC/ECC during these times. We note the ongoing requirement for professional development for controllers/recovery managers.			

Group Controller / Group Recovery Manager Endorsement			
Group Controller / Recovery Manager Name	**Todd Velvin**		
Group Controller / Recovery Manager Signature		**Date**	**05 October 2023**
In conjunction with [name of applicant], I have reviewed their appointment as [Local/Group Controller/Recovery Manager] for the *[Area] by completing the Statutory Appointment Checklist*. I endorse their application for this role.			

CEG Endorsement	
Date of Meeting	**19 October 2023**

Joint Committee Approval	
Date of Meeting	**02 November 2023**

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Appointment Checklist

Applicant Name:	Rob Haveswood

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
1. Relationship Management			
Develops relationships easily with key individuals and partner organisations	✓		
Able to effectively resolve conflict	✓		
Credible influencer and negotiator	✓		
2. Information Management			
Able to identify information needs, the systems functionality and capability to source the information required.	✓		
Able to analyse wide ranging information to inform situational awareness and strategy	✓		
Absorbs and synthesises information but is not distracted by the detail	✓		
3. Risk Management			
Able to understand the hazards and risks and determine community impact	✓		
Applies the principles of risk management	✓		
4. Planning			
Ensures plans are coordinated, integrated and implemented across all levels and partners	✓		
Able to forward plan and assess consequential risk	✓		
Ensures plans are evaluated and updated	✓		
5. Communication			
Communicates with clarity with partners and communities	✓		
Leads and owns public information messaging and engagement with communities	✓		
Engenders confidence with the media	✓		
6. Capability Development			
Able to proactively engage in professional development[1] for self and response staff	✓		

[1] Professional development includes courses, workshops, peer learning and exercises

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
Understands the strategic risk of weak capability and monitors levels of collective capability	✓		
7. Leadership			
Able to maintain strategic overview	✓		
Creates an environment where others are able to succeed	✓		
Able to provide firm but participative leadership in an emergency that influences others towards the achievement of objectives	✓		
Able to create strategic vision, motivate staff and delegate direction	✓		
8. Response			
Able to work within legislative parameters	✓		
Able to quickly analyse information and risk and define credible planning objectives and information needs	✓		
Can work in multi-agency teams and is cognisant of differing roles / functions	✓		
Can effectively manage emergency events from initial stages through to transition to recovery	✓		
9. Personal			
Addresses impact of the role on own family	✓		
Medically fit to work in a high stress environment	✓		
Self-confident, unflappable and remains calm under pressure	✓		
Has confidence of CEO and senior partners	✓		
Is politically astute	✓		
Has good knowledge of local area and communities	✓		
Has high professional ethics	✓		
Manages their own well-being in a pressured environment	✓		
10. Experience, Knowledge and Qualifications			
Understands the Taranaki EOC/ECC procedures	✓		
Completed CIMS 4 or ITF Intermediate	✓	Completed 27/09/2023	
Completion of Tier 1 Response and Recovery Leadership Development Programme			✓
Understands the financial delegations for the Controllers		✓	
Has a good knowledge of the CDEM Act, Plan and Directors Guidelines		✓	

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role Application Form

Applicant Name:	**Damien Clark**
Role Applied for:	**Local Recovery Manager**

Employer Approval			
Manager Name	**Helena Williams**		
Signature		**Date**	7.2.24.
I endorse the application of Damien Clark to the role of [Local Recovery Manager] We note that this person will have a role in a response and/or recovery as a Controller/Recovery Manager and have ensured that that they can be made available to the EOC/ECC during these times. We note the ongoing requirement for professional development for controllers/recovery managers.			

Group Controller / Group Recovery Manager Endorsement			
Group Controller / Recovery Manager Name	Todd Velvin		
Group Controller / Recovery Manager Signature		**Date**	09/02/2024
In conjunction with [name of applicant], I have reviewed their appointment as [Local/Group Controller/Recovery Manager] for the *[Area] by completing the Statutory Appointment Checklist.* I endorse their application for this role.			

CEG Endorsement	
Date of Meeting	26th February 2024

Joint Committee Approval	
Date of Meeting	14th March 2024

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Appointment Checklist

Applicant Name:	Damien Clark

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
1. Relationship Management			
Develops relationships easily with key individuals and partner organisations	X		
Able to effectively resolve conflict	X		
Credible influencer and negotiator	X		
2. Information Management			
Able to identify information needs, the systems functionality and capability to source the information required.	X		
Able to analyse wide ranging information to inform situational awareness and strategy	X		
Absorbs and synthesises information but is not distracted by the detail	X		
3. Risk Management			
Able to understand the hazards and risks and determine community impact	X		
Applies the principles of risk management	X		
4. Planning			
Ensures plans are coordinated, integrated and implemented across all levels and partners	X		
Able to forward plan and assess consequential risk	X		
Ensures plans are evaluated and updated	X		
5. Communication			
Communicates with clarity with partners and communities	X		
Leads and owns public information messaging and engagement with communities	X		
Engenders confidence with the media	X		
6. Capability Development			
Able to proactively engage in professional development[1] for self and response staff	X		
Understands the strategic risk of weak capability and monitors levels of collective capability	X		

[1] Professional development includes courses, workshops, peer learning and exercises

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
7. Leadership			
Able to maintain strategic overview	X		
Creates an environment where others are able to succeed	X		
Able to provide firm but participative leadership in an emergency that influences others towards the achievement of objectives	X		
Able to create strategic vision, motivate staff and delegate direction	X		
8. Response			
Able to work within legislative parameters	X		
Able to quickly analyse information and risk and define credible planning objectives and information needs	X		
Can work in multi-agency teams and is cognisant of differing roles / functions	X		
Can effectively manage emergency events from initial stages through to transition to recovery	X		
9. Personal			
Addresses impact of the role on own family	X		
Medically fit to work in a high stress environment	X		
Self-confident, unflappable and remains calm under pressure	X		
Has confidence of CEO and senior partners	X		
Is politically astute	X		
Has good knowledge of local area and communities	X		
Has high professional ethics	X		
Manages their own well-being in a pressured environment	X		
10. Experience, Knowledge and Qualifications			
Understands the Taranaki EOC/ECC procedures	X		
Completed CIMS 4 or ITF Intermediate	X		
Completion of Tier 1 Response and Recovery Leadership Development Programme		X	
Understands the financial delegations for the Controllers	X		
Has a good knowledge of the CDEM Act, Plan and Directors Guidelines		X	

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Role Application Form

Applicant Name:	**Sandra Boardman**
Role Applied for:	**Group Controller**

Employer Approval			
Manager Name	**Todd Velvin**		
Signature		**Date**	**30/01/2024**
I endorse the application of [Sandra Boardman] to the role of [Group Controller] We note that this person will have a role in a response and/or recovery as a Controller and have ensured that that they can be made available to the EOC/ECC during these times. We note the ongoing requirement for professional development for controllers.			

Group Controller / Group Regional Manager Endorsement			
Group Controller / Regional Manager Name	**Todd Velvin**		
Group Controller / Regional Manager Signature		**Date**	**30/01/2024**
In conjunction with [Sandra Boardman], I have reviewed their appointment as [Group Controller] for the *[Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management] by completing the Statutory Appointment Checklist*. I endorse their application for this role.			

CEG Endorsement	
Date of Meeting	**26th February 2024**

Joint Committee Approval	
Date of Meeting	**14th March 2024**

Taranaki CDEM Group Statutory Appointment Checklist

Applicant Name:	**Sandra Boardman**

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
1. Relationship Management			
Develops relationships easily with key individuals and partner organisations	✓		
Able to effectively resolve conflict	✓		
Credible influencer and negotiator	✓		
2. Information Management			
Able to identify information needs, the systems functionality and capability to source the information required.	✓		
Able to analyse wide ranging information to inform situational awareness and strategy	✓		
Absorbs and synthesises information but is not distracted by the detail	✓		
3. Risk Management			
Able to understand the hazards and risks and determine community impact	✓		
Applies the principles of risk management	✓		
4. Planning			
Ensures plans are coordinated, integrated and implemented across all levels and partners	✓		
Able to forward plan and assess consequential risk	✓		
Ensures plans are evaluated and updated	✓		
5. Communication			
Communicates with clarity with partners and communities	✓		
Leads and owns public information messaging and engagement with communities	✓		
Engenders confidence with the media	✓		
6. Capability Development			
Able to proactively engage in professional development[1] for self and response staff	✓		
Understands the strategic risk of weak capability and monitors levels of collective capability.	✓		

[1] Professional development includes courses, workshops, peer learning and exercises

Skills and Attributes	Yes	Partial	No
7. Leadership			
Able to maintain strategic overview	✓		
Creates an environment where others are able to succeed	✓		
Able to provide firm but participative leadership in an emergency that influences others towards the achievement of objectives	✓		
Able to create strategic vision, motivate staff and delegate direction	✓		
8. Response			
Able to work within legislative parameters	✓		
Able to quickly analyse information and risk and define credible planning objectives and information needs	✓		
Can work in multi-agency teams and is cognisant of differing roles / functions	✓		
Can effectively manage emergency events from initial stages through to transition to recovery	✓		
9. Personal			
Addresses impact of the role on own family	✓		
Medically fit to work in a high stress environment	✓		
Self-confident, unflappable and remains calm under pressure	✓		
Has confidence of CEO and senior partners	✓		
Is politically astute	✓		
Has good knowledge of local area and communities	✓		
Has high professional ethics	✓		
Manages their own well-being in a pressured environment	✓		
10. Experience, Knowledge and Qualifications			
Understands the Taranaki EOC/ECC procedures	✓		
Completed CIMS 4 or ITF Intermediate	✓		
Completion of Tier 1 Response and Recovery Leadership Development Programme	✓		
Understands the financial delegations for the Controllers	✓		
Has a good knowledge of the CDEM Act, Plan and Directors Guidelines	✓		

Date: 14 March 2024

Subject: **Quarterly Performance Report 2023/24 – Q2**

Author: T Velvin, Group Controller, Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Approved by: Todd Velvin, Group Controller, Taranaki Emergency Management Office

Document: 3253219

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present the 2023/24 Quarterly Performance Report (Q2) for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group.

Executive summary

2. Performance reporting for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (the Group) considers the statutory responsibilities under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002), the Taranaki CDEM Group Plan, strategic priorities, and available resources.
3. The Quarterly Performance Report Q2 for financial year 2023/24 has been prepared for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group and is presented for information to the Joint Committee.
4. The Quarterly Performance Report is attached in Appendix A.

Recommendations

That the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management - Joint Committee:

a) receives memorandum, Quarterly Performance Report Q2 2023/24

Discussion

1. This is the Second instalment of performance reporting for 2023/24 financial year for the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (the Group).
2. Work program alignment to the TEMO Business Plan 2023/25 continues with reduced staff numbers.
3. Taranaki CDEM website project is near completion with a launch date of 12 March 2024.
4. RANA project upgrades and developments have been commenced and progressing well.
5. Group Plan
    5.1. TEMO have completed the risk and hazards assessment workshops as stage one of the Group Plan review.
    5.2. Timeline has moved due to realignment process of TEMO. Proposed completion period is late 2024.

Financial considerations—LTP/Annual Plan

6. The annual budget performance is reported in the quarterly report and variations noted.

7. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the CDEM Group's financial policies, and its members adopted Long-Term Plans and estimates. Any financial information included in this memorandum has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.

Policy considerations

8. The Performance Report has been prepared against existing work plan activities and measures in the Taranaki CDEM Group Plan, adopted under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

9. This memorandum and the associated recommendations are consistent with the policy documents and positions adopted by Taranaki CDEM under various legislative frameworks including, but not restricted to, the Local Government Act 2002, the *Resource Management Act 1991*, Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 *and the* Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

Legal considerations

10. This memorandum and the associated recommendations comply with the appropriate statutory requirements imposed upon the CDEM Group listed in Section 17(3) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

Appendices/Attachments

Document 3253219: Quarterly Performance Report 2 2023/24

TARANAKI
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Performance Report

Quarterly Report – Q2
For Financial Year 2023/24

TARANAKI CDEM GROUP



Document Management

Author	Todd Velvin – Group Manager
Date	February 2024
Reviewer	Todd Velvin
	Titles CDEM Group Controller/Regional Manager
Date	February 2024
Endorsed by	Taranaki Coordinating Executive Group
Date	February 2024
Authoriser	Taranaki CDEM Group Joint Committee
Date	March 2024

Version control

VERSION	CHANGES	DATE
v0.1	Original Draft, submitted to CEG for endorsement	26th February 2024

Contents

Taranaki CDEM Group Vision 2025



Where we're going

Our Taranaki community shows resilience through period of disaster, crisis, and change.

Why we exist

We deliver professional disaster risk and emergency management for Taranaki.

What we stand for

Collective responsibility: Shared between National, Group and District level.

Unified approach: CDEM partners work for the overall benefit of the Taranaki community.

Organisational Resilience: Any part of the system can lend support seamlessly.

Strong relationships: Strong effective coordination and integration.

Taranaki Emergency Management Office - Launch Code



Executive Summary

This performance report is for the 2023-2024 financial year for the Taranaki Emergency Management Office (TEMO). Outlines the progress of the Business Plan 2023-2024 for the Taranaki Emergency Management Office.

Highlights for Quarter Two

- The Emergency Management Bill submission is closed and now going through the select committee process.
- Regional Group Risk Assessment Project (part of the review process for the Group Plan) has been completed and draft report presented to CEG.
- He Mounga Puia/Volcanic workshops with MSD and Te Whatu Ora have been run, including two public forums held in New Plymouth and Stratford.
- New statutory positions from Councils and TEMO are being presented to CEG and JC for approval increasing our depth in the region.
- TEMO realignment has been completed, as a part of the larger NPDC realignment.
- D4H Live system build, and testing workshops have been performed.
- TSB Chamber of Business Awards completed, and "Business Continuity" winner announced.

Budget Performance

Currently, TEMO is carrying a variance of $37,131 at the end of this second quarter.

Significant Projects

These projects sit across several workstreams outlined in the TEMO Business Plan. Detailed reports on significant projects are in section 2.

- Website Project - new website about to be launched on the 12th of March.
- Welfare Registration and Needs Assessment (RANA) – significant progress has been made with some offline testing and new power automation set up.
- Volcanic Planning – continuing to work with He Mounga Puia with a central government presentation in Wellington to MPI and other partners.

Section 1 | Budget Performance

Operational and Capital budget performance is reported for TEMO, funded under apportionment arrangements by the four Taranaki Councils as follows:

Taranaki Council	Percentage
Taranaki Regional Council	34%
New Plymouth District Council	40%
South Taranaki District Council	18%
Stratford District Council	8%

1.1 YTD Budget performance

The quarter two financial report ending 31 December 2023 (attached in Appendix A) shows a variance of $37,131.

1.2 CDEM Reserve

The TEMO current CDEM reserve sits at $105,000.

Section 2 | Our Workstreams

This report documents the progress of the Taranaki Emergency Management Office against the Annual Business Plan and work programs for 2023/24

Partnership	Strong partnership and clear expectations from Emergency Management (EM) partners is met through management processes with accountability for delivery.
Risk	Risks from hazards and their impacts are understood, managed, and reduction activities explored to minimise the exposure to communities.
Operational Excellence	Effective management of response and recovery to adverse events supporting the communities, partners, and stakeholders' journey through disasters.
Community	Community resilience is strengthened so that the impacts from adverse events are reduced, empowering all communities to be equipped and adaptive to change.

A summary of the Taranaki Group's progress on these workstreams is provided below.

Key

- Completed
- Tracking to Plan
- Commenced
- Some delays
- Not Started
- On Hold

2.1 Partnership

- Develop Iwi Engagement Plan.
- 75% attendance throughout the financial year from all members at CEG and JC meetings.
- 75% attendance throughout the financial year from all members at advisory group meetings.
- Oversight of emergency management and alignment of work programs where applicable across the CDEM Group.
- Advocate for Business Continuity Plans from partners and contractors supporting council critical work.
- Lead, support, and coordinate where applicable post event review and debriefs.
- Conduct Performance monitoring and evaluation of CDEM in Taranaki.
- Implement Trifecta outcomes across emergency management in Taranaki.
- Update and review Group Plan.
- Provide annual reporting to CDEM governance through CEG and JC.
- National Work Groups – NEMDG, Tsunami, Welfare, REMAs, SIG.



2.2 Risk

- Develop community risk assessment across the region.
- Engage with top 10 community groups identified in Community Risk Assessment to build understanding and knowledge of their local hazard scape.
- Hazard risk information is availability to communities as outlined in the Community Engagement Strategy.
- Continue working with scientific partners around He Mounga Puia project and outcomes.
- Support TSVAG with regional hazard science exploration.
- Identify and explore enablers to progress Volcanic planning.



2.3 Operational Excellence

2.3.1 Response

- Continue implementation of the 5-year GIS strategy.
- Participate in National systems and campaigns testing operational readiness.
- Develop and maintain CIMS function Standard Operational Procedures for the ECC and train and exercise to standards.
- Align and implement functional Standard Operational Procedures for the EOC. Train and exercise to regional structures.
- Embed D4H as the EM operating system.
- Monthly ECC checks.
- Annual auditing of ECC and EOC.
- Ensure and maintain EOC is operational.
- Develop, implement, and maintain training and exercising for volunteers, as per the training and exercise schedule.
- Deliver training and exercising to volunteers at a local level, including CIMS function meetings.
- Identify leads for every function.
- Hold CIMS function meetings with 75% attendance bi-annually.
- Develop and implement volunteer strategy.
- Develop and Review Response and Recovery Plans as per the planning schedule.
- Review Response Management Plan.
- Maintain a 24/7 duty system for the region.
- Response to recovery transition imbedded within CIMS training.



2.4 Recovery

- Ensure Recovery function is resourced as required at a Local and Group level.
- Deliver training and exercising to volunteers, including CIMS function meetings.
- Development of Recovery exercise to effectively test Taranaki CDEM Group recovery arrangements with alignment the Taranaki CDEM Group Training and Exercising Plan.
- Undertake community risk assessment to identify potential geographic and communities of interest and subsequent recovery enhancement activities.
- Develop a targeted community resilience engagement programme with priority communities.
- Develop a framework for conducting recovery impact assessments.
- Further develop Critical Infrastructure / Lifeline Advisory Group business plan and resilience projects.
- Continue to engage with scientific community to incorporate recovery thinking into hazard and risk research.
- Incorporation of strategic recovery elements into Group Plan.
- Development of recovery operational plan.
- Hazard specific recovery planning - Develop and Review Response and Recovery Plans.
- Local authority recovery planning to improve community resilience and manage risks through land use, complimentary to regional activity.
- Connect Council Long-Term Plans and community engagement initiatives with pre-disaster planning.
- Development of a Taranaki CDEM Group Debrief Policy for consistency and standardisation of post-event and exercise debriefing processes.



2.5 Community

- Implement Communication and Marketing Strategy.
- Deliver targeted community education campaigns.
- Promote business continuity within the region as per community engagement programme.
- Advocate for the requirement of business continuity plans with partner agencies through CDEM advisory groups.
- Support local level emergency planning across the 4R's .
- Develop and implement local level emergency planning across the 4R's.
- Develop and implement Community Engagement Plan.
- Community Emergency Plans are developed where appropriate in partnership with communities.
- Review and rationalise Emergency Centres across the region to ensure fit for purpose and in a state of readiness.
- Implement the Iwi/Māori engagement plan.



Section 3 | Significant Projects

A significant project is defined as one that, alone or in combination with other concurrent projects, is anticipated to cause sustained work impacts greater than what is considered tolerable for delivery within existing TEMO resources.

3.1 Welfare Registration and Needs Assessment (RANA Resilience Funding)

Contributes to: **Operational Excellence and Community**

Status Tracking to Plan

RANA was created as an interim solution, during the initial COVID response, for the short term while NEMA was developing a national solution. The development of the system was to provide a consistent regional approach to collect, analyse, and manage information to understand individuals, whanau, and communities affected by an emergency and their associated needs.

A National solution has not been realised, and therefore it is prudent that Taranaki continues to move forward in this space as registration and needs assessment provides the basis for welfare service delivery. Needs assessment includes the provision of a system to assist with meeting the immediate and ongoing welfare needs, and coordinating the actions required to meet those needs, in an integrated and flexible way.

Needs assessment provides the means of identifying and coordinating welfare services during emergencies and is therefore of direct benefit to people affected by emergencies and agencies with welfare service delivery responsibilities. The absence of a system within the region exposes us to real risks in being able to respond to emergency events which has been well documented during recent events in Auckland and Hawkes Bay.

The National Resilience Fund (NEMA) for $35,200 to upgrade and develop features into the product was successful, and this work will begin once the offline capability has been completed.

Work is well underway with Sharepoint Agency who was appointed to manage this project, and should be completed mid-March. This will provide the ability to collect and manage needs assessment data effectively in an event. Work on the surveys themselves has been undertaken in consultation with the Welfare Coordinating Group and the Rural Coordinating Groups.

Several other CDEM Groups have expressed interest in supporting this product; with ongoing discussions being held at a National level involving all Group Managers and Group Welfare Managers.

3.2 Website Development

Contributes to: **Community, Risk and Operational Excellence**

Status Tracking to Plan

The Taranaki Emergency Management Office (TEMO) website project commenced on the week of 14th of August. The site is set to go live on February 27 on new URL www.taranakiem.govt.nz.

Performance load testing for the site was completed on 1st of February with adjustments to the sites upscaling capability made. The site was tested to the maximum load of 10k users for 10 minutes successfully being able to handle this. Penetration testing for the site was completed on February 9th and identified no security concerns.

The site has been designed to have business-as-usual sections targeted at preparedness, a purpose-built response page used during emergencies, and a recovery section. To continue the work on the response page Otago Emergency Management are funding an application to NEMA's resilience fund. This is supported by us, and the three other groups who are also with the same website company. The extra funding is intended to make the page more accessible and be used for user testing with audiences such as those who are blind and deaf.

The launch campaign for the website will begin one week before on our social media channels (Facebook and Instagram). Messaging has been put on the old and new website to alert the public of the change. On March 4th all TEMO staff will have their email addresses changed to XXX.XX@taranakiem.govt.nz to align with the change in URL. This will not affect where you send emails to, and the old addresses will still receive emails.

3.3 D4H Operations

Contributes to: **Operational Excellence**

Status Tracking to Plan

The D4H Live Development & Embedment Project aims to ensure Taranaki CDEM has access to fit for purpose emergency management software, with the high-level goal to "improve the speed, accuracy and consistency of response decisions and coordination of actions at Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) and Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs)".

The system development is complete and all initial action plans and tasks have been created in the system.

The focus now is on system rollout through a training and on-boarding plan. Rollout aims to train key response leaders and function managers at each of the Council emergency facilities (ECC and EOCs) and develop an online self-paced onboarding package that will also serve as a rapid onboarding for external surge staff. The response system will be tested in the upcoming National Exercise Ru Whenua in June 2024.

System development identified various enhancements that were out of scope for the initial project, and these will be considered for future projects in consultation with CIMS function staff.

A paper is presented to CEG to seek adoption of the operational system at local EOC and ECC levels within Taranaki CDEM Group.

3.4 Group Plan

Contributes to: **Partnership, Risk, Operational Excellence and Community**

Status Delayed

In February 2023, the Joint Committee approved the option to commence an interim review of the 2018-2023 Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Plan. As TEMPO has progressed with that review it has become apparent that the update to the plan is wider than an interim review and therefore, we are seeking endorsement from the Coordinating Executive Group and approval from the Joint Committee to undertake a rewrite of the Group Plan. A rewrite of the

Group Plan allows us more scope to incorporate the findings of the Risk Assessment, include the regional recovery strategy and review the Group's Vision and Values. This recommendation is supported by current advice from NEMA.

Any legislative changes, including changes to Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act can be reviewed and added as and when required.

Toa Consulting Ltd has been engaged to facilitate the risk assessment process. Four risk assessments workshop have been completed, a final survey to complete the project will be sent by the end of the October. The results from this Risk Assessment are scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2023.

3.5 Volcanic Plan

Contributes to: **Partnership, Risk, Operational Excellence and Community**

Status

A memorandum has been presented to the Taranaki Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive Group (CEG) in February 2023, for TEMO to apply to the NEMA Resilience Fund for $335,000 (excl GST). The funding to be used to support a line of enquiry phase delivered by an independent contractor in support of Mt Taranaki volcanic response and recovery planning. This will be achieved through the application of an 'Investment Management Standards' (IMS) process. Unfortunately, this application was not successful, and we will need to look at alternative avenues of funding.

Mt Taranaki has a 50% chance of erupting in the next 50 years, with eruption activity likely to last for many years if not decades. The '*Transitioning Taranaki to a Volcanic Future'* (TTVF) or *He Mounga Puia research programme* (2019 – 2024) has created a wealth of information and awareness of the Taranaki volcanic hazard. Now in its final years, the research has exposed a scale and magnitude of cascading consequences for emergency response and recovery that are more complex than first anticipated.

The complexity and scale of response and recovery planning for Mt Taranaki underpins TEMO's view that a North Island wide coordinated programme of volcanic response and recovery planning is necessary to manage the likely interdependencies across the regions from what is anticipated to be a nationally significant volcanic event.

Collaborative and coordinated CDEM projects are relatively well understood and embedded in New Zealand with four currently in existence. These projects have proven to help strengthen stakeholder relations and improve outcomes.

Experience from the 'East Coast LAB' project identified the importance of ensuring clarity on the problem to be addressed - including assessing the scope, identifying stakeholders, resources required, articulating the benefits, identifying any risks/challenges, establishing roles and responsibilities, and importantly confirming stakeholder/community interest and engagement.

Given the complexity and potential impacts of the volcanic hazard presented by Mt Taranaki, it is important the scope and planning requirements for this hazard are identified and verified before solutions are recommended.

Funding is sought to contract an independent facilitator and any technical experts they require to deliver a series of workshops as part of an 'Investment Management Standards' process. The workshops support a more in-depth discovery of volcanic response and recovery planning requirements. They do this by strengthening thinking and decision making around resource prioritisation and allocation and will help inform the development of a programme business case of which the contractor will deliver.

Full outsource of the IMS process is recommended. Contractual arrangements will be sought that allow TEMO to bring in technical expertise from partner agencies and research providers at their sole discretion to bring costs down where we can.

An in-depth discovery of Taranaki volcanic planning requirements upholds the intent of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy while also presenting an opportunity to align with the National CDEM plan including NEMA's catastrophic planning approach. It also provides an opportunity to enhance inter-regional CDEM relations.

In the meantime, we continue to work with the project team in developing an engagement strategy in order that we can begin to share the latest hazard and impact science with those that that it was created to support. Facilitate workshops and forums across the region to understand impacts and resilience within the lifelines, rural, public service, and health sectors.

3.6 Legislative and National Plan Review

Contributes to: **Partnership, Risk, Operational Excellence and Community**

Status Delayed

In 2021 the EMSR program was replaced by the NEMA led Regulatory Framework Review ("Trifecta") Programme to bring together three projects that have significant alignment. The projects are:

- Developing a new Emergency Management Act (the Act);
- Review the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order (the Plan Order) 2015 and the accompanying Guide to the National CDEM Plan (the Guide) 2015.
- Development of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) Roadmap.

The EM Bill was reintroduced to Parliament in late 2023 and is now proceeding through the select committee process.

The National Plan is currently on hold due to focus on the Act changes and Bill for Parliament.

Section 4 | Regional Risk Register

The Group Office is committed to managing risks that may impact the delivery of the Taranaki CDEM Group activities and services and/or the ability to meet its legal obligations.

4.1 Risks

TEMO are currently reviewing the risk management framework for monitoring, reviewing, and reporting risks.

Physical risks will be managed through the NPDC system (Pinnacle) and Operational risks identified through audit, review & inspection and assigned dates with ownership being monitored monthly.

The Corporate register will record significant and/or strategic risks relevant to the CDEM Group, reporting annually to this forum in the form of a corporate risk register.

Section 5 | Personnel

- TEMO has completed a realignment lead by NPDC which has seen significant staff changes. We have had three staff members take redundancy and interviews have taken place for the recruitment of three new positions.
- During the realignment we saw one person leave on their own accorded to take up other opportunities.
- Two candidates have accepted the positions of Senior Planner and Community Resilience Advisor.
- The role of Team Lead is currently vacant as Ben Ingram has accepted a two-year secondment as GM for the Housing Trust Initiative. We are currently looking to back fill this position with a secondment or fixed term contract.
- The general well-being is still of concern for our employees, and we have acknowledged the difficult period the current staff have endured during this restructuring process. We continue to monitor and implement well-being measures to build and support a high performing team.

Section 6 | Appendices

Appendix A: TEMO 2023/24 Financial Report

Profit and Loss Summary Report for December 2024 for TEMO

	TEMO			
	246EMA	246EMR		
	Actual YTD December	Budget YTD December	Variance YTD	Note
Revenue				
Other revenue				
160 - User fees and charges	75	0	(75)	
169 - Other Operating incl Rebates & Recoveries	(31,825)	0	31,825	1
Total Other revenue	**(31,750)**	**0**	31,750	
Subsidies and grants				
180 - Operating Grants & Subsidies	(763,007)	(763,007)	0	
Total Subsidies and grants	**(763,007)**	**(763,007)**	0	
Vested Assets				
195 - Gain on Sale	(4,161)	0	4,161	
Total Vested Assets	**(4,161)**	**0**	4,161	
Total Revenue	**(798,917)**	**(763,007)**	35,911	
Expenses				
Personnel costs				
220 - Salaries and wages - Payroll Only	559,019	478,017	(81,002)	
223 - Other employee benefits - Payroll Only	13,788	19,079	5,292	
224 - Employee Development & Education	4,731	22,513	17,782	
225 - Employer contributions - Payroll Only	18,004	12,009	(5,995)	
229 - Other personnel costs	8,618	2,500	(6,118)	
Total Personnel costs	**604,160**	**534,118**	(70,042)	2
General operating expenditure				
231 - Insurances	5,952	5,068	(885)	
232 - Legal and professional fees	11,146	82,203	71,057	
233 - Occupancy and utilities	12,348	6,293	(6,055)	
234 - Property Maintenance	10,096	1,750	(8,346)	3
235 - Communications	8,737	3,750	(4,987)	
236 - Advertising and Marketing	2,536	15,042	12,506	
237 - Hardware & Software	11,935	0	(11,935)	4
238 - Travel and accommodation	8,587	4,200	(4,387)	
245 - Other general costs	13,201	12,693	(508)	
Total General operating expenditure	**84,539**	**130,999**	46,460	
Direct costs of activities				
250 - Contracts	20,726	17,710	(3,016)	
251 - Engineering and Technical advice	1,000	0	(1,000)	
253 - Services	3,237	0	(3,237)	
254 - Materials	(181)	0	181	
255 - Fleet & Plant Consumables & Maintenance	9,958	5,100	(4,858)	
258 - Grants & Funding Expenditure	2,000	0	(2,000)	
Total Direct costs of activities	**36,741**	**22,811**	(13,930)	
10 - Depreciation - operational assets	**57,829**	**45,211**	(12,617)	
Total Expenses	**783,268**	**733,139**	(50,130)	
EXTERNAL OPERATING (PROFIT)/LOSS	**(15,649)**	**(29,868)**	(14,219)	
INTERNAL CHARGES				
300 - Pass thru from Shared Services expense	**(38)**	**0**	38	
310 - Labour allocation expense	**210**	**2,573**	2,363	
315 - Fixed Amount Charge of Shared Services	**97,670**	**97,670**	(0)	
320 - On-charges expense	**1,884**	**2,472**	589	
330 - Interest allocation expense	**21,784**	**21,784**	0	
INTERNAL RECOVERIES				
APPROPRIATIONS				
391 - Depreciation funding/ (unfunded)	**(57,829)**	**(45,211)**	12,618	
395 - Capital Appropriations	**0**	**(38,579)**	(38,579)	
TOTAL NET RESULT	**48,031**	**10,840**	(37,191)	

Note 1

- Moved Ministry of Civil Defence budget to account 1691 and corrected accrual in January.

Note 2

- Redundancy Payments made of $129k unbudgeted. $37k Recovered for Ben Ingham's secondment.

Note 3

- Property Maintenance overspend.



Transaction Listing

Ledger Name:* 24GENA Actual 23/24

Account Number:* 10-115-3060-2340-WK NPDC TEMO Group Offi TEMO Robe Stree Expenses Mai...

A consolidated account can also be entered eg 1-Q-@@@

Search: Retrieve Saved Search Status:* All All Periods

Drag a column header here to group by that column

Date	Reference	Type	Period	Amount (NZD)	Balance Amt (NZD)	Narrative
31/01/2024	18/BM01-PP55	APINV	8	155.83	6,545.87	18/BM01 January 2024 NPE Fire Maintenance Contract
8/08/2023	00020818	APINVPO	2	1,120.00	1,120.00	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '465221' DES (NZ) LIMITE
9/08/2023	13020	APINVPO	2	95.00	1,215.00	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '465150' PESTAWAY NZ LTD
9/08/2023	20332512	APINVPO	2	178.40	1,393.40	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '464317' AGGREKO NZ LIMI
28/08/2023	6943037	APINVPO	3	649.61	2,043.01	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '466026' CHUBB NZ
12/09/2023	20332828	APINVPO	3	1,789.81	3,832.82	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '465173' AGGREKO NZ LIMI
30/09/2023	021686	APINVPO	4	142.00	3,974.82	Builder Task 'WORKS', '465793' TCM LTD
19/09/2023	20332890	APINVPO	5	260.20	4,235.02	21849103 - TEMO 6M AGGREKO NZ LIMI
8/11/2023	2023105939	APINVPO	5	1,410.41	5,645.43	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '465222' WIRELESS NATION
27/11/2023	6987742	APINVPO	6	649.61	6,295.04	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '469950' CHUBB NZ
13/12/2023	14058	APINVPO	7	95.00	6,390.04	Other Labour Task 'WORKS', '465150' PESTAWAY NZ LTD
4/07/2023	AJ00006390	JNLACR	1	-414.60	-414.60	64NPE Tech - 18/BM01 Fire Maintenance Co HMN Estimate based on prior month FY23 - June 2023 Ac...
28/07/2023	AJ00006475	JNLACR	1	414.60	0.00	64NPE Tech - 18/BM01 Fire Maintenance Co JM Month End Reversing wrong amount FY23 - June 202...

Note 4

- Software Expenses is overbudget, large charge from Jandal Media. This is RANA project and recovering cost through Resilience fund.



Transaction Listing

Ledger Name:* 24GENA Actual 23/24

Account Number:* 10-115-1001-2370-00 NPDC TEMO Group Offi Operations Expenses Softwar...

A consolidated account can also be entered eg 1-Q-@@@

Search: Retrieve Saved Search Status:* All All Periods

Drag a column header here to group by that column

Date	Reference	Type	Period	Amount (NZD)	Balance Amt (NZD)	Narrative
30/06/2023	57156267	APINVPO	1	30.00	30.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
31/07/2023	57565244	APINVPO	2	30.00	60.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
31/08/2023	57974123	APINVPO	3	30.00	90.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
30/09/2023	58375999	APINVPO	4	30.00	120.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
31/10/2023	59408575	APINVPO	5	30.00	150.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
31/10/2023	SPA-0550	APINVPO	5	7,400.00	7,550.00	TEMO - Expenses incurred for the develop JANDAL MEDIA
30/11/2023	59937706	APINVPO	6	30.00	7,580.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE
31/12/2023	60357720	APINVPO	7	30.00	7,610.00	TEMO - SMS texting service for D4H emerg VOYAGER INTERNE

AGENDA AUTHORISATION

Agenda for the Taranaki CDEM Joint Committee meeting held on Thursday 14 March 2024.

Approved:

7 Mar, 2024 12:57:47 PM GMT+13

S J Ruru
Chief Executive